



**JMG – DEPARTMENT OF JOURNALISM, MEDIA  
AND COMMUNICATION**

# **EUROPE(ANS) AND THE CLIMATE - TOWARDS A EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE?**

A Comparative Framing Analysis of News Media and Twitter Discourse  
in Sweden, Spain and Germany

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# Abstract

The issue of climate change, as a crisis without borders and the EU as political realm, holds the potential to unite Europeans under a common fate and mission. As this study applies a social constructionist view, reality is understood as constructed in and through the media. The aim is to examine if and how mediated communication on climate change reinforces a European identity, and hence creates a European Public Sphere. This is looked at through a comparative framing analysis of news media and social media in Sweden, Spain and Germany in the week after the European Parliament's climate emergency announcement in 2019. Theories of the European Public Sphere, European Identity, Global Journalism and Social Constructionist Framing build the grounds for this thesis. A systematic reading of mediated communication of climate change, guided by categories of a European Outlook facilitate this qualitative framing analysis. The results of this study do give reason for some speculations about the Europeanization of national discourses happening parallel in Spain and Germany. Swedish news media scarcely showed a European Outlook, whereas an emerging counter-public on Swedish Twitter enables a re-politization of the climate debate. An issue public sphere, or "European risk community" can be spoken of, rather than a European Public Sphere. Support can be found for a European identity, carried by an "imagined community" of countries dependent on a strong EU and an identification through the latter. This gives reason to assume, that the global crisis of climate change goes both ways. It does strengthen the Europeanization in some countries, but it weakens it in others.

**Keywords:** Climate Change, Framing, European Public Sphere, European Identity

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# 1. Introduction

On November 28, 2019, a week before the UN Climate Change Conference in Madrid, the European Parliament declared a climate and environmental emergency. This symbolic act acknowledges the EU's awareness of the widths of anthropogenic climate change and stresses the urgency of immediate action.

Climate change, its development, and its consequences have been researched since the 1960s. Public engagement on the issue, however, varied over the years, as it is a fairly hard topic to translate to the news due to its scientific, long-term, and statistical character. With the help of activists like Greta Thunberg and the *Fridays for Future* movement, the climate crisis has found a spike on the media and political agenda once again. We see plenty of global conferences and initiatives from governments and economic leaders to find solutions and policies to mitigate CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and adapt to the consequences of rising global temperature and the extinction of ecosystems. The public debate is as lively as ever and widely driven by young people, who are generally more concerned about the consequences of environmental destruction and global heating (European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 490). This is reflected in a general mobilization seen since 2018, with millions taking to the streets to protest for more climate action. This mobilization has transcended age, ideology, and origin, as climate change poses an immediate threat to the security and quality of the life of many. A debate about scientific certainty on climate change had been surpassed in Europe for some time, as a debate on climate action and concrete policies replaced the former. Now again, some voices doubting anthropogenic climate change become loud.

With the United States withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, and the world's largest greenhouse gas emitter, China, increasing its fossil fuel consumption in 2019, global climate action in accordance with the Paris Agreement seems farther away than ever. Sub-global bodies of action have become more important. As climate change is global in nature, and its policies are debated in a global plexus, the connection between the transnational political realm of Europe, the global nature of the problem, and a traditionally national outlook of the media shall be looked into in this study.

A survey conducted by the European Commission (Eurobarometer) in 2019 states that 93% of European respondents think climate change is a serious problem, with 23% considering climate change as the single most serious problem facing the world today (European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 490). The two most present global climate activist movements in 2019, Fridays for Future and Extinction Rebellion grew out of European countries (Sweden and the UK). The media coverage and public debate around solutions, protests, and demands for political action have not calmed down ever since.

Europe has been struggling internally, faced by populist and nationalistic movements throughout the EU, questioning its eligibility. Topped by "Brexit", an identity crisis is often spoken of. The core problem of the transnational conglomerate seems to be its 'democratic deficit' leading to a struggle for a political identification of its people with the EU. A European Identity and further a European Public Sphere is lamented to be lacking. Could the issue of climate change, as a crisis without borders and the EU as political realm, unite Europeans under a common fate and mission, and therefore reinforce a European identity, and hence a European Public Sphere?

Through looking at the communication around climate change, European outlooks shall be analyzed in this study, to see if such development is taking place. Climate change reporting in the news media of different European countries, as well as the parallel debate on social media, will be examined through a qualitative framing analysis.

## **2. Research Objective**

This study aims to see how climate change is framed in the news media and social media of European countries and if and how specifically there is a Europeanization of the climate change discourses in Spain, Sweden and Germany, as representatives of the European Union.<sup>1</sup> This comparative case study shall undertake an analysis of the mediated communication on climate change the week after the European Parliament's climate emergency announcement in these

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<sup>1</sup> for a description of the country selection see Chapter 7.2.

three European member states. A qualitative framing analysis will be used to discover the degree and quality of a European outlook in the stories and media content in order to finally discuss the predicaments for a development of a European Public Sphere.

Taking into the analysis the discussion on social media is believed to give insights into how frames translate from news media into public discourse. It is assumed that this unique combination of topics will give clues on the state of European publics and their organization in a possible transnational European Public Sphere, driven by national media and their framing approaches, as well as the public discourse organized through social media networks.

From a communications point of view this study also fills a void within the field of framing analysis with regards to the issue of climate change in recent years. Little is published yet that considers the recent spike in saliency of the issue. As this study will facilitate a constructionist approach to framing, it also follows a research tradition that has gotten less attention over the past decade.

### **3. Background on Media Representations of Climate Change**

First, an overview over the research that this study builds on shall be presented, as well as a problematization of climate change reporting that is necessary to understand the conditions of this thesis, putting it into context within the field of communication. Throughout this thesis, a social constructionist view is taken. To begin with, the notion of the social construction of crises shall be explored.

#### **3.1. The Media's Role in Risk and Crisis: A Social Constructionist View**

The media as a public forum is not only essential for environmental phenomena but every other societal issue in order to be acquitted public and political concern (Hansen in Hansen & Cox, 2015: 26). The emergence of the social constructionist perspective on social problems in the 1960s and early 1970s is crucial for media and communication studies as we know it today and shall be outlined in the following.

Hansen (2015) argues that social problems and the discourse around them cannot be looked at separately, as the communication that 'defines' them as problems consequently constructs them as such. The problem character of an issue is hence constructed through a rhetorical act in public or a "discursive achievement" in public arenas (Hansen in Hansen & Cox, 2015: 27). The social constructionist perspective was first brought about by sociologists, who helped widening the scope of communication research on environmental issues further than journalism studies, which typically discuss these topics on the basis of journalistic norms like balance, bias and objectivity (cf. Boykoff, 2004, 2007, 2010). Further, they inspired the sociological discussion on media's influence in "public and political controversy about the environment" (Hansen in Hansen & Cox, 2015: 28).

The same logic of 'constructing reality' applies when talking about the mediation of risks and crises. "[D]angers do not exist 'in themselves', independently of our perceptions. They become a political issue only when everyone becomes aware of them; they are the products of social stagings which are strategically defined, covered up or dramatized with the aid of scientific materials" (Beck, 2008: 84). What Ulrich Beck states in his work on the 'risk society' is none other than the media's role in constructing social realities in the post-modern world. Disaster and crisis response, moreover, their very coming to attention, relies on media and communications (Cottle, 2014). Through mediation, today's crises carry the opportunity to overcome boundaries of the 'national' and the 'transnational', they even form global communities, and enable legitimation of political authority or economic power (Cottle, 2014: 17). Further, the political is by default connected to these mediated crises, which leads to questions of power and representation. Cottle (2014) warns to focus on the ways in which politics enter these representations and urges to research the interplay between political elites and mass media challenged by social media (2014: 10).

The crisis of global climate change can be categorized as a long-term crisis, which has many faces and is hard to cover journalistically. It is therefore a very interesting case of crisis reporting and construction to look at.

### **3.2. The Struggles of Media Reporting on Climate Change**

It has been a struggle for journalists to cover the scientifically complicated and multi-faceted issue of climate change over the years. From the realms of scientific and geological reporting, it has to be translated for public understanding. If we regard news character and journalistic norms, this unobtrusive issue is hard to report on. Its global nature is diametrical to the national character of news. As this issue urgently needs solutions by politics and citizens alike, a call for action has to be expressed through the media. The willingness to act must be rooted in an understanding of the consequences and an awareness of the science behind global climate change. An understanding of its economic, political, social, and cultural consequences is crucial to the presentation and understanding of Climate Change as a social problem. The interplay between science, politics and the media is of utmost importance for this very issue. Communication practices create and determine the modes of political engagement with climate change (Carvalho et al., 2017). Unfortunately, a rising scientific consensus does not imply public engagement and a higher level of informed citizens (Eide, 2017: 34). The idea of science producing knowledge that journalism transports to informed citizens and hence mobilize political participation does not hold. Accordingly, it is crucial to look at how environmental issues come to public awareness, rise to media attention, but foremost how they are even defined as "problems". From a sociological perspective, the study of social problems is a prerequisite to understanding their coming to media attention. Kituse & Spector (1973) give a classic definition of social problems, as "the activities of groups making assertions of grievances and claims with respect to some putative conditions" (1973: 415). They underline the notion of "claims-making" of groups, who bring these social problems to public attention. The maintenance of the problem status depends on these groups' continued existence and tenacity to claim circumstances as a problem, as well as their attempt to do something about it (Kituse & Spector, 1973: 415). Three theories go into this definition, the first being an element of interest, as the claim-makers try to protect their own social, economic, or political interests. Further the authors name 'moral indignation', the process of calling out social conditions that offend general values, and lastly, natural history, which describes the cyclic character of social problems as moving through different stages (Kituse & Spector, 1973: 418). These have been further developed since, by Blumer (1971) and have ultimately led to the development of theories of issue-attention cycles in the news media. The issue of climate change has been brought up primarily by such claim-makers, who defined it as problems. Although scientists

have made this claim all along, people from the "public" have been the driving forces in bringing the problem of climate change to public attention, as Greta Thunberg, for example, famously did in 2018.

### **3.3. Issue-Attention Cycles and the Post-Politization Debate**

When we look at the history of climate change topics being thematized in public discourse, an ebb and flow dynamic best describes the way in which the issue leaps to public attention through the years. During the last two decades, Al Gore's documentary 'An Inconvenient Truth' (2006) and the hype around the climate summit in Copenhagen (2009) are described as "'quantum leaps' in ecological awareness" by some researchers (Kenis & Lievens, 2014). The spike in media and public attention started by Greta Thunberg and the Fridays for Future movement in 2018 can be argued to be the latest of these leaps. The so-called "issue-attention cycles" (Downs, 1972) describe the dynamic in which social problems emerge to public consciousness and after remaining for some time deviating again, despite being "still largely unresolved". The conceptualization of issue-attention cycles is contested within the field, as it is described as "too linear and inflexible" (Andersson, 2009: 169 f). Metacycles of environmental attention, referring to the entirety of environmental issues, classifying single environmental issues into the issue categories catastrophe, scandals, alarm, and controversy might better describe these processes (Djerf-Pierre, 2013: 509). These four categories do appear in cyclical patterns, reflected in single or recurring waves of high density in news coverage (Djerf-Pierre, 2013: 505). Climate Change is most prominently represented in the category of environmental alarm, generally originating from scientific sources in the initial stages of reporting, whereas politicians and interest groups are likely to take over the issue at a later stage, leading to a politization of the such (Djerf-Pierre, 2013: 507). Attention in one domain drives attention towards other domains alike, which is a process that continues until an issue fatigue both among journalists and the public is reached and the attention dies down (Djerf-Pierre, 2013: 509). These categories give a more detailed look at environmental news and provide a framework to explain the latest "wave" of media attention towards climate issues in more detail.

Berglez and Olausson (2014 b) bring up a debate about the post-political stage of climate change. A legitimate controversy belongs to a healthy democracy, but a consensus about anthropogenic climate change had been reached throughout Europe. They argue that the more

climate change is established as post-political, the more likely counter-ideological patterns such as climate skepticism, climate-denialism, and even apathy can occur, as they see signs of these in Sweden at the time of their writing (2014 b: 69). Following the public debate on climate issues in Europe, these reactions are particularly present and mostly parallel to populist groups and tendencies that have seen an uprise in most of Europe recently. It remains to be seen how this dualism is reflected in the media coverage and the online public discourse in the different countries. How the topic of climate change is framed by the media and respectively discussed online will hopefully produce knowledge on how social and political discourse is held in Europe, and if we still can speak of a post-political stage of the climate change debate today.

Now that the background for media reporting on climate change has been delineated, a closer look at previous research on climate change reporting, with a focus on framing studies shall be taken. The focus on framing studies derives from the aim of this study. It is therefore the core interest of this short research review to make out what has been done before and where the field shows research gaps that this study could fill.

## **4. Research Review on the Framing of Climate Change**

The importance of media and communication for climate change has long been acknowledged by the scientific community. Studies on media representations of climate change have been around since the early 1990s (Schäfer & Schlichting, 2014). Attempts to outline and summarize the research field in systematic reviews do exist, taking a historic approach (Moser, 2010), putting a focus on including cultural, political economy, structuralist and culturalist approaches (Anderson, 2009), highlighting political aspects (Carvalho, 2010) and outlining the research field as a whole (Schäfer & Schlichting, 2014). Understanding how we obtain information, make sense of the world, and come to our interpretations through the framing of news in the media is highly important. The media plays a central role in how our knowledge is shaped and more so influences how we engage and act on global threats like climate change. The academic coverage of framing on climate change news in the media is therefore of utmost importance for both academia and practitioners, journalists, government officials, and activists alike. Most research focuses on European or Northern American countries, however, a rise of studies

focusing on Asian countries could be noticed over time. Further, print media is, for the most part, the subject of interest, nevertheless, a steady rise of analysis regarding online media and social media is noted lately (Schäfer & Schlichting, 2014: 149 f.) with studies thematizing framing on Twitter (Meraz & Papacharissi: 2013; Burch et al.: 2015).

As this thesis focuses on the framing of climate change throughout European countries, with an emphasis on the construction of European themes, this review will concentrate on studies that have taken a comparative approach to analyze the framing of climate change.

#### **4.1. Comparative Framing Studies**

Generally, there is a plethora of research on the framing of climate change. The popularity of studying framing has become prevalent in the field, with a strong focus on quantitative studies focused on framing effects. Still, a call for more comparative studies has been voiced over the years.

Among these, a common finding is the homogenization of frames across countries, a phenomenon described by many authors (Shehata & Hopmann: 2012; Lück et al.: 2018; Olausson: 2009, Reese: 2008). As climate change is a global phenomenon, the opportunity for cross-national studies can give clues about the very characteristics of journalistic procedures in each country and define differences and similarities in the journalistic coverage of that topic. Across the different corners, these studies derive from, the argument about the homogenization of international reporting and a greater reflection of the growing scientific consensus on climate change has been reported on consistently (Shehata & Hopmann: 2012; Lück et al.: 2018; Olausson: 2009). Comparative studies on news coverage across national borders show, that domestic political elite discussion and scientific consensus have a weak influence on the framing in the respective countries and find that media coverage is strikingly similar especially considering their use of frames (Shehata & Hopmann: 2012; Lück et al.: 2018).

#### **4.2. Frames vs. Narratives**

Simultaneously, Lück et al. (2018) have found that the countries still differ in their use of narratives. The researchers were able to define cultural particularities on newspaper coverage

despite the global trend of the homogenization of frames. As an explanation for this phenomenon the study names the transnational settings of events like the UN climate conferences as fertilizers for such developments, as they are in the spotlight of global attention, provide comparable working conditions, and equal access to information for journalists (Lück et al.: 2018). As mentioned by other researchers (O'Neill: 2013, Höijer: 2010, Olausson: 2009) differences in the degree and type of narrativity with which information is made culturally applicable for a certain audience can be explained with the respective country's journalistic tradition.

Frames have shown to possess the ability to transcend cultural differences. The discussion of journalistic norms and modi is covered in several articles (O'Neill: 2013, Lück et al.: 2018, Höijer: 2010, Olausson: 2009, Boykoff: 2004, 2007). Olausson (2009) speaks of a failure by the news media to act as the fourth estate. The differences between reporting on climate change in Europe and other parts of the world might be explained by differences in national journalistic culture. These divergences in the styles of reporting can also be regarded as "expressions of the media's responsiveness to the political settings in which they operate" (Olausson, 2009: 433). This research distinguishes two levels of culture after Mancini (Lück et al., 2018: 1651). The globalized professional culture, which encompasses the aforementioned trend towards homogenization in journalistic production (issue framing) and the rather distinct national cultures journalists operate in (specific narratives). Mainstream national views on climate change and climate politics are reflected by the dominance of a specific story type in the news coverage. Lück et al.'s (2018) study demonstrates a country's strategic position in global climate politics (e.g. the perceived role as climate change victim with no responsibility, or perceived relationship to other countries) is mirrored by narrative roles rather than frames.

At this point, a preview on the choice of method in this thesis might be helpful, as the diverging methodologies seem to impact the very understanding and definition of framing. The studies that delineate frames from narratives predominantly apply a quantitative content analysis. I argue, that by facilitating a qualitative reading of media texts, with a focus on the facilitators of frames, a more nuanced description of cultural differences can be achieved. The approach of a social constructionist view on framing, which is not widely applied in the field, allows a more attentive interpretation towards cultural differences within the analysis of frames. Further, the

understanding of "storyline" as frame is used in this study, which is explained in a later chapter. Therefore, "narratives" are not analyzed as such, but somewhat discovered through a framing analysis, as these are thought as unfolding narratives, or storylines about an issue, facilitated through framing devices. Lück et al. (2018) themselves acknowledge a non-deterministic and dynamic relationship between framing and narration, as they disclaim that a chronology in news production or reception is nonexistent (Lück et al., 2018: 1639).

### **4.3. Europeanization and Global Outlook**

Although a homogenization of frames between various countries is agreed on, these findings also make visible a gap in research on the interplay of Europeanization and framing of climate change. The importance of a "transnational political realm of Europe for the construction of news frames on global environmental risks in European media" (Olausson, 2009: 433) is stressed. Moreover, a common European modus operandi has been pointed out by some researchers: "[The] relationship between media frames and the structures of power seems to expand beyond the borders of the nation-state, into the transnational sphere of Europe" (Olausson, 2009: 433). The "Europeanization process" of journalism in European countries is achieved methodologically closest by an interpretation of "media representations", allowing for the inclusion of culture in the method of discourse analysis (Olausson, 2009) which opens up for these nuanced findings. The unique point of this thesis is the mindfulness towards a European outlook of and in news frames. Closest to this undertaking are the studies of Ulrika Olausson and Peter Berglez on Europeanization, European Identity (Olausson, 2009), Global Discourse (Olausson: 2013; Berglez: 2008, 2013) and Climate Change reporting (Olausson & Berglez, 2014 a, 2014 b). This study builds on the findings of these two researchers and hopes to add to the stock of knowledge by its unique application of this outlook on a comparative study, as well as extending the analysis across digital media, to the social networking site Twitter. The Europeanization of mediated discourse on Twitter has only been researched in a quantitative manner before (Hänska & Bauchowitz, 2019). The comparative approach that will be taken enables an understanding of the "Europeanization process" of journalism in European countries. The added layer of social media, represented by Twitter in this case, will hopefully give clues on how frames represented in the press deviate into public discourse and could show if and how frames translate into the public sphere. Further, an exchange or European cultural

stock of frames can be confirmed or rejected, as well as the development, similarities, and differences of each countries framing of climate change discovered.

## **5. Theories & Key Concepts**

In the following, the theories and key concepts this study builds on will be outlined. The combination of different theories presented in this thesis account for the study design. Each theory provides different aspects that will be used to illuminate the results, yet some theories might have to be rethought or developed.

### **5.1. European Identity and European Public Sphere**

#### **5.1.1. European Identity**

"[T]he sovereignty of the nation-state is collapsing under pressure from global and local forces. Economic necessities are compelling states to surrender parts of their sovereignty to supra-national organizations. The European Union is a good example: no longer do the parliaments of the member states have the powers which they formally had. National identity no longer enjoys its preeminence as the psychological identity that claims the ultimate loyalty of the individual. Instead, it must compete with other identities on a free market of identities." (Billig, 1995: 133)

Billig, in his work "Banal Nationalism", describes a phenomenon that is commonly noticed by researchers regarding identity in the times of globalization. As globalization facilitates the weakening of national power, Europe, as a middle ground between the "global" and "the national" is said to be on an ongoing quest to find a collective identity of its own (Olausson, 2010: 138). Parallel to the expansion of the EU, a feeling of political belonging that reinforces political legitimacy is part of this identification. However, the much-discussed 'democratic deficit' of the European Union underlines the continuing predominance of the national as a legitimate realm of political identification against the influence the EU has on people's everyday lives (Olausson, 2010: 139). The struggle for a collective identity derives from the core purpose of the EU. The European Union, as stated in the very name is deeply rooted in the quest for unity. This unity can be expressed and reflected by a collective identity. In 1984, long before the Maastricht treaty of 1992, the European Commission delineated:

"Information is decisive, perhaps the most decisive, factor in European unification. [...] European unification will only be achieved if Europeans want it. Europeans will only want it if there is such thing as European identity. European identity will only develop if Europeans are adequately informed. At present, information via the mass media is controlled at national level." (Commission, 1984; in Polonska-Kimunguyi & Kimunguyi, 2011: 511)

As pointed out by the European Commission, the (mass) media plays a crucial role in creating this European identity. Implied in that statement is the need for the media to inform the citizens and, in their reporting, enshrine a European identity. Through that identity, common interests, beliefs, and central political identification, European unity can be achieved. This is a crucial point to the concept of a European identity, as it does not exist by default, unlike national identity. It takes place in and through the mass media, its existence is dependent on the performance of the media and its reporters. In a social constructionist notion, Olausson (2010) operationalizes European identity as constructed in the news media, hidden in everyday news reporting, as the Commission had predicted so early. She refers to Gripsrud (2007) in characterizing identities as 'layers', where a European layer of identity can be added and coexist with an already established national one (Olausson, 2010: 140). A conflict of identities, like described by Billig (1995) does not necessarily have to be the case, parallelism or layers of identity are found to be a more realistic description.

### **5.1.2. European Public Sphere**

To grasp the construction of the European identity through public communication, the European Public Sphere must be looked at as a realm for interpretation (cf. Trenz, 2005: 413). The two concepts of European identity and European Public Sphere are intertwined, as it is not clear whether a collective European identity is a precondition or the result of a European Public Sphere. Most probably, a co-creation best describes the relationship.

As Trenz (2005) writes, the public sphere is a "discursive community that allows for the recognition of actors as legitimate participants in political discourse and constructs the collective identity of the political community" (2005: 409). He points to the direct relation between the European Public Sphere and the "performance of democracy in the EU" (Trenz, 2005: 408). However, the undertaking of a European Public Sphere and hence a European Identity was for a long time perceived as a project from above, initiated by the European

Commission, rather than a collective mutual feeling of belonging (Polonska-Kimunguyi & Kimunguyi, 2011: 511). The "project" of the European Public Sphere is hence an undertaking deeply rooted in European political identity. However, there are very different understandings of what is meant by a European Public Sphere, which fuel the long-standing debate on its very existence. Some scholars have undertaken the task to give an overview of the many definitions present in the debate (DeVreese: 2007; Trenz: 2005; Eriksen: 2005; Walter: 2017).

### **Thick vs Thin Descriptions of the European Public Sphere**

Generally, two broad conceptions of the European Public Sphere are determined in the literature. A 'thick' description of the public sphere, also referred to as "public sphere heavy" has come to be superseded by a 'thin' description, referred to as "public sphere light" respectively.

The "father" of the Public Sphere, Jürgen Habermas, imagined it as a singular, supra-national, pan-European Public Sphere that shares a common language and identity through a transnational media system (Habermas, 2001). Habermas' focus on discussion and deliberation is often said to be unrealistic. The implied focus on consensus is criticized, as heterogeneity and disagreement are seen to be more fruitful for democratic political life (DeVreese & Boomgaarden, 2006). Critics of the 'thick', Habermasian public sphere in relation to Europe (Schlesinger: 1991; DeVreese: 2002; Eriksen: 2005; Stępińska: 2011; Hands: 2006) largely reject his utopian definition as it has repeatedly shown to be unachievable in reality. A 'thin' approach is described as the more feasible and empirically confirmed notion, outlined as a Europeanization of national public spheres (cf. Trenz: 2004, 2005; Stiff et al.: 2007; Gerhards: 2000; Machill et al.: 2006; Hänska & Bauchowitz: 2019; Olausson: 2009, 2010). Olausson suggests a 'political' conception of a European Public Sphere, as the identification with a political 'Us' rather than the "unfeasible project" of a cultural conception that presupposes a common language, world view and shared history (Olausson, 2010: 149). This conceptualization of a European Public Sphere, rooted and produced by mediated communication in the press is at the core of this study.

The media's role in creating mutual awareness and a common frame of reference in reporting is implied: "We can speak of a European public sphere, if and when people speak about the

same issues at the same time using the same criteria of relevance and are mutually aware of each other's viewpoint's" (Risse, 2003: 3). This notion will serve as a working definition of the European Public Sphere for the later analysis in this thesis. Further, a European Public Sphere seems to be a feasible project to research by conducting a framing analysis, as "a common frame of reference" is pointed out as one main characteristic.

This overview over the theories and academic discussion on European Identity and European Public Sphere points out the question of how the media in general and news media, in particular, are supposed to achieve this European identity through reporting. In the research on "Global Journalism", a so-called 'global outlook' in reporting is described. These concepts can easily be translated on a European level and shall, therefore, be adapted as a framework within the analysis.

## **5.2. Global Outlook - European Outlook**

As the European Commission had stated, a European identity can only be achieved in and through the media. However, media systems are still tailored to a national focus in reporting. This does not reflect the interconnectedness and global nature of the world today. Issues are interrelated, things that happen in one place can have consequences for people and places on the other side of the world. Global threats like terrorism, cyber warfare, and climate change have long made national borders redundant.

Faced by a global crisis such as climate change, not only do we see a change in global power relations but also in global media relations. Re-thinking national news media reporting and introducing "global journalism", journalism beyond domestication, as a way to cover global issues in a globalized world, has been part of media and communication studies in the past decades. At the heart of global journalism discussion is the tension between the local and the global. Newsworthiness is determined by its relevance and cultural, political, or economic proximity (Galtung and Ruge: 1965, 67). The debate around domestication in the early 1990s stressed the importance of "local cultural frames and narratives" (Kunelius & Yagodin In Kunelius et al., 2017: 83). Later, domestication has been taken further, to not only see it as the reception of global topics but as reconstructing global discourses in local news by using local

actors and achieving its local articulations (Kunelius & Yagodin In Kunelius et al., 2017: 84). The construction of the national "we" presents a compromise with this tension between local and global, creating an "imagined community" that allowed bridging the different life realities of audiences. The same conflict has re-immersed in the late twentieth century, now between the national and the global, making room for speculations and theories about a "global public sphere". Through modern technology, transnational communication is made possible, which emphasis is put on by many scholars to be able to transgress national borders (Castells: 2008; Volkmer: 2015). In a way, the categories of foreign and domestic news have to be rethought. Climate change is in its global nature diametrical to the national outlook of news. Beck (2006, 2008) constitutes a 'cosmopolitan era' that refers to a "world-view increasingly defined by a sense of global conflict, crisis, and risk" (Nossek & Kunelius, 2012: 71). Global risks such as climate change share the aspect of "delocalization", where causes and consequences are no longer limited to one location, "they are in principle omnipresent" (Eide & Kunelius, 2012: 127).

The practice of 'global journalism' is described by Berglez as a news style that "makes it into an everyday routine to investigate how people and their actions, practices, problems, living conditions, etc. in different parts of the world are interrelated" (Berglez, 2007: 151). It reflects the "journalists' basic ability to connect the local and global in storytelling" (Van Leuven & Berglez, 2016: 669). Regarding global journalism as a practice, (Berglez, 2007, 2013; Reese, 2001, 2007, 2008) a few different theoretical angles are introduced.

Reese (2001, 2007, 2008) theorizes globalized journalism, focused on the structural changes of the profession throughout globalization processes. He has called this phenomenon a "global news arena", where "multiple perspectives and interpretations are in circulation at any given time, but still with heightened mutual awareness, reflexiveness, and timeless in their reaction to one another" (Reese 2008: 242). This leads to journalists being more interconnected and an emerging "horizontal' (global) professional awareness" (Nossek & Kunelius, 2012: 70). This horizontal awareness is thought to translate into an exchange and maybe even homogenization of frames when reporting on global issues that concern multiple nations, and could even hint towards a common public sphere. Against these notions, others point to the reduction of the

journalistically trained editorial staff and foreign correspondents and the often claimed "decline of professional journalism".

Concrete conceptualizations and expressions of this global news style/global outlook are presented by Berglez (2013). These will be the pillars of the later analysis.

### **Identity, Interest, Power, Space as Tangible Representations of the Global Outlook**

The global news style includes journalistic representations of *global interest*, *global power*, and *global space* (Berglez, 2008: 849). These will be adapted towards an analysis of the "European news style" and will form the pillars of the empirical part of this study. A deeper look into their respective working definitions shall be provided, as well as Berglez's empirical questions related to the categories. It is explained how the global can be interchanged with the European, as it fulfills the same criteria, but is further restricted in space and scope.

#### **5.2.1. Identity**

Identity is thought as 'collective identity' in this case and involves socio-cultural and socio-cognitive processes (Moscovici, 2001: 33 f.). National identities or supra-national identities such as a European one are more or less 'imagined', which is why their reproduction and discursive anchoring is part of their manifestation in everyday life. As such it "requires symbolic material for its production, maintenance, and transformation" (Olausson, 2009: 3). The news media plays a pivotal role in this process, as it "symbolically (re)constructs certain ideas of the world and our place in it" (Olausson, 2009: 3). As political identity is defined contextually, the topic of climate change could be a fertile ground for a European identity. In order to detect the such, the ways in which journalism transcends national borders to represent (political) identities (cf. Berglez, 2013: 35) is looked at.

In the global news style, identity struggles, such as a 'global north vs south' divide are described (Berglez, 2013: 42). Accordingly, the global, as well as the European north/south and even 'east vs west', are thinkable dimensions identity could be manifested in a European sense. Second, a (common) global public 'voice' or 'people' reflected by news journalism (Berglez, 2013: 43) is noted by referring to 'the entirety of humankind' or 'citizens of the world'. This can easily be

adapted to a 'people of Europe' and will be tested for in a European context. The third way Berglez presents is "news journalism, discursively connecting or uniting people with potentially similar identities across continental borders, based on political ideology, gender, class, subculture, etc." (Berglez, 2013: 43). This does naturally apply in a European against the background of climate change action.

### **5.2.2. Interests**

As an added measure to Berglez's concepts of power, space, and identity, interests shall be tested for as a feature of Europeanization in this thesis. Interest, as the idea about collective identity derived from the Marxist concept of class consciousness, where identity is tied to a class's values, solidarity, and interests (Marx: 1964, 1970). Alexander Wendt (1994), who looks at the role of states in the international order, ascribes collective interest a prominent determining role. Constructivist political theory is very similar to social constructionist framing, as they share the focus on social discourse and its power to create identity. A country is not only determined as a collective actor but as part of groups, formed through alliances between countries. This grouping causes countries to identify with each other, as their common position internationally, their common interests bind them in their collective identity. Wendt describes four basic interests: 'physical security', 'ontological security' described as "predictability in relationships to the world, which creates a desire for stable social identities", 'recognition as an actor by others' and 'development' (Wendt, 1994: 385).

These tie in with the notions of the European identity and public sphere, the power structures between national and supra-national, collective, and national identity. Therefore, interests are believed to add an indispensable layer to understand how Europeanization is facilitated. To detect these representations of interests the ways and extent to which parts of groupings, identifying with each other, express common (political) positions or interests are looked at.

### **5.2.3. Power**

Power strongly relates to the categories of interest and identity. A 'European power' heavily depends on a symbolic production of a European identity, as this legitimizes the EU as a relevant political realm to solve problems, such as climate change (cf. Olausson, 2009: 5).

Thereby an interaction between power and identity takes place, as the two reinforce each other. Berglez (2013) defines power as "the capacity to implement a goal as well as a relation between institutions, groups, and individuals, which involves influence and/or distribution of resources" (2013: 38). The European style of reporting would describe climate change as a mix of European and national powers, ultimately presenting Europe as the political realm to combat climate change and its consequences.

#### **5.2.4. Space**

The biggest share of reported news events does not take place locally anymore, so journalists need to report about issues from a distance whilst connecting its relevance with the local or national community. Oftentimes, space becomes redundant in global journalism, when no particular locality is needed or apparent, see for example the phenomenon of climate change. To detect the use of such news style, the representation of space in the form of a multifaceted geography is in focus. Space is expressed through journalism that "interrelates processes and practices occurring simultaneously in separate places worldwide" (Berglez, 2013: 35). This can easily be translated for the European context of this study, looking at representations of space, oddly enough in its absence, more precisely in the absence of national 'venues' of climate change, in favor of a European space. Further, ways in which several places are connected through processes happening globally, and a distinct focus on spacial descriptions of the EU as a single space in relation to other spaces are the focus of the analysis.

These categories reflect what Peter Berglez (2013) describes as the 'global outlook'. The global outlook is a cognitive framework and a distinct kind of discursive content achieved by the journalist as they report a story, including its background and style of writing (2013: 2). Using the categories in a European realm, as described above, one can speak of a European outlook, which will be analyzed through a focus on representations of European identity, interest, power, and space.

Surprisingly, this global outlook, adapting to the global reality of issues, is mostly researched in the realms of news reporting in a classic way. Thinking back to globalization, the paradigm of networks, especially the Internet and social media comes to mind. Seldom, these notions are

tested against the discussion happening in social networks, although this could give interesting clues about the nature of public discourse, and possibly public spheres. "The Internet, though viewed as a metaphor for a new global communication infrastructure 'decentralizes' the advanced globalization process and creates [...] a new social, cultural, and political infrastructure [...]"(Volkmer, 2003:12 f.). Surprisingly, the World Wide Web has shown to be relatively conformed to national borders (Halavais: 2013; Berglez: 2013). Even if social media allows occasional issue-based global public spheres (Volkmer, 1999), the Internet with its digital news flow does not provide a global news discourse in Berglez' (2013) sense, as there are hardly any global outlooks (2013: 105). Cottle (2013) calls for research on global journalism to "take into account the interconnectivity between 'old' and 'new' media, and attempt to bring "ontological and epistemological outlooks closer together" (2013: 29). As these studies point out, a fresh look on the topic, taking into consideration the present media environment and the since developed social media into account. The interconnectedness of old and new media could produce knowledge about the development of the global outlook in online and social media.

The global news style or global journalism does present the tools needed to determine a European outlook in the media. It remains to be seen if these notions can also be found in mediated communication on Twitter, as these are concepts usually located in journalism. It is assumed, that a European outlook, facilitated in the news media through frames, will translate to the discussion on social media.

### **5.3. Framing Theory**

In order to detect the ways in which a common European Outlook, or further the notions of 'identity', 'interests', 'power' and 'space' are constructed in the media, the concept and theory of framing will be delineated, as it helps to explain how reality is presented in the media. A unitary conceptualization of framing is impossible, as the research field is scattered and ever-growing. The glasses through which this thesis regards framing and facilitates the analysis shall be explained in the following.

Probably the most recited definition of framing stems from Robert M. Entman (1993), who considers a more problem-defining character of frames. In his understanding, to frame is "to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text,

in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described" (1993: 52). We will come back to this definition at a later stage in this chapter.

### **5.3.1. Framing - A Fractured Paradigm**

Entman (1993) saw the potential of framing as a research program but voiced his concerns about its "scattered conceptualizations" that he regarded as an impediment toward it developing into a paradigm. He argues that the inconsistency of key terms like "frame", "framework" and "framing" had led to a "fractured paradigm" of framing research (1993: 51). As a response, D'Angelo (2002) argues in Lakatos' (1974) 'sociology of knowledge' sense, that such competing views within a research program are fruitful and beneficial for the field and the understanding of framing, as there is not one, nor should there be one single paradigm of framing (D'Angelo, 2002: 871). He categorizes the different conceptualizations into three distinct paradigms, the cognitive, critical, and constructionist paradigm (D'Angelo, 2002: 871).

Research in the cognitive paradigm of framing focuses on the psychological, individual information processing, hence framing effects. Its primary interest is the interplay between the frame and an individual's prior knowledge, which is referred to as existing as schemata in memory (D'Angelo, 2002: 875). In the critical view, it is journalists and news organizations who select and "spin" information so that there is no frame contest or "still foster a single viewpoint supportive of the status quo" (D'Angelo, 2002: 876). This is significantly opposed to cognitivist's understanding, as they frequently point to the differentiating frames about one issue or event even within the same news item (D'Angelo, 2002: 876). As framing research develops throughout time, today, critical and constructionist notions are often put together in a more fluent approach. The focus shifted towards looking at texts since the 1970s/80s.

### **5.3.2. Social Constructionist Framing Approach**

For this thesis, the theoretical perspective of framing will root in the social constructionist notion (D'Angelo: 2002; Entman: 2010; Gamson & Modigliani: 1989; Van Gorp: 2007). The Social Constructionist Paradigm is characterized by its focus on the social origin and use of frames, and the question of how meanings are constructed and circulated in society. The historic approach that Vliegthart & van Zoonen (2011) present in their article on the development of

framing research, advocates applying a sociological perspective to framing research, calling for more frequent use of the constructionist approach to framing. They describe how framing was introduced to the social sciences by Gregory Bateson in 1955, who argued that statements lack intrinsic meaning, but would acquire these through a frame that is constituted by context and style (Vliegthart & van Zoonen, 2011: 103). As frames in van Gorp's view are part of culture, they are stable and consequently change little over time (Van Gorp, 2007: 63).

"[F]raming involves the interplay that occurs between the textual level (frames applied in the media), the cognitive level (schemata among the audience and media makers), the extra medial level (the discourse of frame sponsors; [...]), and, finally, the stock of frames that is available in a given culture" (Van Gorp, 2007: 64).

In contrast to Gamson & Modigliani (1989) who see frames as distinct from personal schemata, Van Gorp underlines the constructionist approaches goal to understand frames embedded in media content and interacting with mental schemata of journalists and members of the public (Van Gorp, 2007: 61). Further, he suggests that the actual frame is not encompassed in media content because it is part of culture (Van Gorp, 2007: 63). In his understanding, frames are neither used or selected by journalists, but rather part of a "dynamic social process where social reality is produced, reproduced, and transformed" (Van Gorp, 2007: 73). That frames are reproduced and negotiated in social interaction introduces the question, of whether frames in the news media translate to the public discourse, which we can see reflected in the discourse on social media platforms. An exchange between frames from public discourse and the news media would support this understanding. As some authors notice, these interpretations of framing are well known among communication scholars, nevertheless scarcely taken into consideration in current framing research (Vliegthart & van Zoonen, 2011: 105). I argue, that these are exactly the characteristics of frames that could prove to be useful for a 'holistic' analysis of mediated public discourse. It acknowledges the interrelations between news frames, culture, politics, and personal experience, all of which create the realistic realms of public discourse and deliberation in democratic systems, perfectly suited for an analysis of the global climate crisis.

### **5.3.3. Towards a Definition of "Frames"**

Based on early findings, the widely cited definition of Robert Entman arose: to frame is "to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral

evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described" (Entman, 1993: 52). In his interpretation, "a 'frame' is a tool employed to promote a particular version of reality" (Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011: 107), implying intentionality and therewith standing in stark contrast to the studies that define frames as the "results of interactions and conflicts between collective and individual social and media actors" (Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011: 107). In this study, a wider definition is applied, looking at understandings of reality in a domain of issues (!), not necessarily looking at problems per se, which is why another definition becomes necessary.

Deriving from early studies, Reese (2001) thinks frames as "organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world" (Reese, 2001: 11). Gamson et al. (1992) postulate that framing is innately involved in the construction of meaning, thinking frames as 'storylines' or "an unfolding narrative about an issue" which makes them material to a shared part of culture, distinct (!) from personal mental schemata (Gamson et al., 1992: 385) The definition of understanding frames as "storylines" and cultural phenomena, will function as the working definition of frames as latent concepts for the analysis in this thesis.

#### **5.3.4. Methodological Shortcomings and Identification of Frames**

Although these understandings of frames could be established, no real operationalizations can be found in these theoretical texts. Van Gorp comes closest to methodological implications, as he establishes a so-called 'frame package' in which he includes "the manifest framing devices, the manifest or latent reasoning devices, and an implicit cultural phenomenon that displays the package as a whole" (Van Gorp, 2007: 64). Framing devices, which are word choice, metaphors, exemplars, descriptions, arguments, and visual images (Van Gorp, 2007: 64) make an underlying, latent frame become apparent and manifest in media content, as they all point to the same core idea of how to understand the issue described (Van Gorp, 2007: 67). Reasoning devices, which are also included in said frame package are more useful if a problem is regarded, closely linked to Entman's (1993) understanding of framing. In this study, framing devices are focused on in order to determine a frame used in the media content. Reasoning devices and visual images are disregarded in this study. Van Gorp (2007) does not go into further detail on

how these devices might look, nor does he give examples that could facilitate methodological implications or tools. Van Gorp himself stresses the importance of the researcher's interpretation, as frames cannot be found or detected but are interpreted and constructed by researchers. Hence, when occurring together, framing devices make certain interpretations more likely than others. Regardless of the methodological shortcoming presented in the theory, the descriptions give enough guidance to facilitate an analysis grounded in these theoretical considerations, as will be explained in the methods chapter.

After outlining the theories needed to understand the interplay of the many different topics at the core of this study, the research questions guiding the analysis shall be presented.

## **6. Problematization and Research Questions**

In this study European themes in Climate Change reporting are looked at in particular, in order to see, if a European Outlook is established. This European Outlook will be looked at through a framing analysis, specifically focused on the European themes of identity, interest, power, and space. The following research questions will guide the analysis.

### **Q1: How are space, power, identity & interests constructed in the news media articles on climate change?**

To reduce the scope of the analysis towards tangible representations of Europeanization, the categorizations of space, power, identity (cf. Peter Berglez, 2013), and interests are facilitated as frame categories. Further, how these frame categories are expressed in the news articles are subject of analysis. These are expected to identify and cover a development of Europeanization, when analyzed towards representations of Europe in particular and will ultimately enable a discussion on the existence of a European Public Sphere.

### **Q2: How does the framing of climate change differ in the mediated discourse of European countries?**

Under special consideration of the cultural, political, and climate contexts, a comparison between the framing of climate change in the three countries of analysis is held. A further

spotlight will be shined on possible translations of frames between countries, or a homogenization of frames, which could point towards the state of the Europeanization of public discourse on climate change. Taking Europe as a focal point of the analysis, a comparison between the countries' framing of especially the declaration of the climate emergency will be at the center of the study.

The two-fold analysis, including analysis of the news media on the one hand and public discourse on the social media microblogging platform Twitter, on the other hand, is facilitated to give insights into the specific situations and abilities for deliberation, frame contests, and alternating views. Further an understanding of the roles and limitations, which the different media have in Europeanization processes, as well as an overview of the state of the climate change discussion in Europe shall be achieved.

### **Limitations**

Limitations of this study shall not be left unnoticed. As this study is focused on the realms of climate change, the evidence found for processes of Europeanization might be bound towards this singular issue. It is assumed, that the general sentiment will give space for generalizations, however, a delimitation towards the realm of the climate change discussion shall be kept in mind. Further, Twitter as a representation of public discourse might turn out as flawed, as the user base might not be representative of the relevant demography. As the notions of 'the public' and public discourse are however hard to define realistically and even harder to test for, these public interactions between members of the same public, that are exposed to the same media system, will provide as 'closest possible case' to look at public discourse in this study. Further, an analysis of visual content is rejected due to the time and scope limitations of this study. The importance of visuals for framing, especially in climate change reporting is acknowledged by the author, nonetheless, a sole focus on textual content is thought to be acceptable for the aim of this thesis.

## 7. Research Method & Design

In the following, the method and research design of this study shall be delineated before the results and analysis are presented. In order to answer the previously formulated research questions, a qualitative framing analysis of media representations is going to be facilitated.

### 7.1. Choice of Method

As outlined in the theory chapter, framing in this study is thought in terms of the social constructionist approach, which examines frames as constructed ways to understand the world around us, leading to shared assumptions about reality. The central notion is that meanings are not individually created but a conjuncture of shared experiences, cultural surroundings, and communicative exchange. As an inspiration for this method, I use Vliegthart & van Zoonen's (2011) take on the constructionist framing approach, but as they do not present concrete methodology, Van Gorp's (2007) suggested methodological implications, focusing on framing devices, will be added. As delineated earlier, these do not adequately suffice as a research method, hence a qualitative systematic approach to document analysis (Altheide & Schneider, 2013) will complement the analysis. "Document analysis refers to an integrated and conceptually informed method, procedure, and technique for locating, identifying, retrieving, and analyzing documents for their relevance, significance, and meaning" (Altheide & Schneider, 2013: 5). This systematic qualitative approach goes further than content analysis as it includes ethnographic research and is mindful of "understanding social meanings for actors, including social contexts, situations, and emotions" (Altheide & Schneider, 2013: 2). The aim of this approach is to understand culture, social discourse, and social change "by studying documents as representations of social meanings and institutional relations" (Altheide & Schneider, 2013: 5). The qualitative reading of these documents, guided by the systematic categorization through pre-selected frame categories, an integrated approach allows the combination of many different document kinds, suited equally for newspaper analysis as well as for the analysis of social media content.

As van Gorp (2007) outlines, frames shall be reconstructed by looking at the framing devices used in the text. Behind these there is a cultural phenomenon as a central idea, that needs to be

detected by, in this case, a qualitative systematic reading and analysis of documents. Accepting a heuristic principle, the idea that "a series of manifest variables can represent a latent concept" (Van Gorp, 2007: 71) a two-step analysis will be used to discover the reasoning devices for each framing package. As van Gorp suggests, this analysis will use a carefully chosen set of media texts (news articles and tweets) and determine which text elements might function as framing devices (Van Gorp, 2007: 72). Focusing on the aspects of power, space, identity, and interests, an inductive approach to look at the framing devices behind these representations, ("how are they represented?") shall be used. By understanding frames as storylines, including basic aspects of narrative and storytelling, the central organizing principle in the text can be distinguished and delineated in a short description or title.

## **7.2. Choice of Countries**

The countries of analysis, Germany, Spain, and Sweden, have been chosen based on various characteristics. Due to language restrictions, unfortunately, no Eastern European country could be analyzed, which would certainly be of academic and societal interest and should be considered for further studies in the field. For this study, the European North, South, and Central Europe are represented nevertheless. Each country has a different position within the EU, geographically and politically, different media landscapes, and also very different climate contexts. They represent the 'most different systems' within Europe for this comparative case study, as we seek to identify features that are the same (frames) among otherwise different media, political and climate systems in an attempt to account for similarities in a particular outcome (European Outlook on Climate Change) (cf. Esser & Vliegenthart, 2017: 6). These different contexts shall be delineated shortly.

### **7.2.1. EU - Context**

Unlike Sweden, Germany and Spain are part of the so-called "big six", as they belong to the group of countries that contribute to 70% of the European population and 73% of the GDP, and are referred to as the "EU Powerhouse" (ECFR, 2018: EU Coalition Explorer: 11). Sweden, located in the north of the EU, is part of the so-called "affluent seven", describing highly developed smaller EU member states.

Sweden joined the EU in 1995 and has been less involved within the EU compared with Germany and Spain, but has rather manifested its leadership role within the Scandinavian countries (ECFR, 2018: EU Coalition Explorer). Traditionally, Sweden has been more reluctant towards multilateral cooperation, as well as somewhat more self-confident and independent (cf. Gebhard, 2013).

Germany can be considered a leader within the EU, as it has the strongest economy, is one of the founding countries, and a diplomatic leader during international negotiations (Eckersley, 2016: 186 f.). In particular the common notion of carrying a "heavy burden of history" is represented in Germany's understanding of its roles and responsibilities in Europe and internationally, muting a national identity, while making a European identity much more explicit (Eckersley, 2016: 187). This, in particular, will be subject of analysis in later chapters of this thesis.

Spain represents the south of the EU and is one of the European countries suffering most from climate change. For Spain in 1985, after years of dictatorship under General Franco and somewhat isolation from the world, joining the EU meant a possibility to develop economically and undergo social modernization (cf. Díez Medrano, 2003).

### **7.2.2. Climate Action Context**

Sweden leads the Climate Change Performance Index at the fourth place as a high performing country in regards to climate change efforts. In this ranking, Germany, as a highly coal-dependent country, is located on place 23, Spain on place 34 due to its lower ambition. With the EU as a whole ranked on place 22, both Germany and Spain fall behind the EU's average (Germanwatch: Climate Change Performance Index, Results 2020).

Sweden's strong climate policies and advocacy at the EU level are rated high by experts. Nevertheless, this is still not enough to reach the Paris Agreement goal of a well below 2°C pathway, as Sweden, the strongest financial contributor to the Green Climate Fund would have to lower its emissions to net-zero by 2030 (Germanwatch: Climate Change Performance Index, Results 2020: 18).

Apart from the climate policy category, where Germany was ranked high due to its ambitious advocating on an international level, its climate efforts are rated medium overall. The national climate package, introduced in 2019, was evaluated as insufficient for reaching the Paris Agreement. The backfill in renewable energy expansion, especially in the on-shore wind sector is criticized (Germanwatch: Climate Change Performance Index, Results 2020: 20).

Despite Spain's international ambition and its strong stance in a coalition of EU Member States advocating more ambitious climate targets at the EU level, the country's climate efforts are criticized by experts on a national level. An overall lack of ambition, a missing strategy to phase out fossil fuels and insufficient national targets to reach a below 2°C mark are the reason for this low rating (Germanwatch: Climate Change Performance Index, Results 2020: 21).

Due to severe heatwaves that hit central Europe in recent years, Germany is the country third most at risk to suffer from climate effects in the world, the Climate Risk Index reports, which ranks countries by their vulnerability to the effects of climate change. Spain ranks 38th place and Sweden at the 105th place (Germanwatch, Global Climate Risk Index, 2020).

### **7.2.3. Media Context**

In terms of Hallin & Mancini's categorizations of media systems, Sweden and Germany belong to the 'Democratic Corporatist Model', with Sweden moving towards a liberal direction in recent decades. It is described to have a mass press, with a historically high political parallelism, professional and proportional public broadcasting, a strong professionalization, and a strong role of the state (cf. Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Spain is part of the 'Polarized Pluralist', or 'Mediterranean Model', which is characterized by an elitist press, high political parallelism, and government public broadcasting, weak professionalism, and a strong role of the state. The model has been subject to criticism, due to its scope, Eurocentrism and relative inflexibility to change. Hence, the countries' media landscapes will be further outlined, based on the Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2019.

Sweden's media landscape is a mix of public service broadcasters, commercial legacy news media, and an emerging branch of alternative news media. The latter are mostly found on the

right political spectrum, reaching around 10% of online news readership weekly, which is comparable to the online reach of the two largest quality newspapers. Overall trust in the news was found at 35%, which ranks Sweden on place 25 out of the 38 countries studied (Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2019: 110). A share of 8% use Twitter for news, with Facebook being the social medium ranked highest for news access (32%), followed by YouTube and Facebook Messenger (Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2019: 111).

Germany looks back on a long tradition of the mass media, with the printing press still playing a major role in distributing political news today. In a traditionally strong television-focused country, more Germans have moved online to access news. The German print market is the largest in Europe, however, the decline in printed paper is rapid, as the main demography is made up of older readers who grew up with the medium. Regarding trust in news, an overall 47% makes Germany rank on place 12 out of the 38 countries analyzed (Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2019: 86). Twitter is accessed for news by 5% of the people asked, preceded by Facebook (22%), YouTube, WhatsApp, and Instagram (Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2019: 87).

The Spanish print media is quite distinct from its European neighbors. Spanish journalism has a pronounced tendency towards commentary, with a focus on opinion. The weak professionalism and strong state intervention in the media traditionally marked Spain as one of the countries whose citizens show the lowest trust in their media, which seems to have changed, looking at the latest reports. The political turmoil Spain underwent in 2019 was matched by changes in media organizations. Online news thrived, and trust in media was regained ahead of the elections, a trust rate of 43% was established, which ranks Spain at place 19 of 38 (Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2019:109).

For social media, Facebook tops the list of use for news (47%), followed by WhatsApp, as 52% share news via social, messaging or email, YouTube, and Twitter as fourth most used social medium for news (16%) (Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2019: 109).

	Sweden	Germany	Spain
<b>Trust in News</b>	35 %	47 %	43 %
<b>Twitter for News</b>	8 %	5 %	16 %
<b>Reach largest online newspapers (per week)</b>	Dagens Nyheter: 14%	SpiegelOnline: 18%	El País: 24%
	Svenska Dagbladet: 13%	t-online: 15% SZ: 9% FAZ: not stated	El Mundo: 18%
<b>Media System</b>	Democratic Corporatist, moved towards liberal	Democratic Corporatist	Polarized Pluralist

Source: Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2019. Sample Sizes: SWE: 2030; GER: 2066; ESP: 2087

Fig.1: Media Context

### 7.3. Choice of Media to Examine

News articles and tweets are analyzed in this study. For each country, the two quality newspapers with the widest spread were chosen, accompanied by the leading financial newspaper. For Sweden, *Dagens Nyheter* (DN), *Svenska Dagbladet* (SD), and *Dagens Industri* (DI) as financial paper were chosen. As German papers, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ), *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ) and as financial paper, *Handelsblatt* are looked at. *El Mundo*, *El País*, and lastly *Expansion* as the financial paper were chosen for the Spanish case. The print bias is acknowledged and the author is aware of the kind of public opinion mainstream press is able to convey; namely the public opinions of powerful stakeholders and actors as elite opinions and an assumed opinion of 'the broader public'. This is why this analysis goes further and adds the layer of analyzing Twitter content, where it is assumed that an actual, unfiltered discussion of members of the public takes place and can give clues to the relation of these portrayals of public opinion, as well as towards the very implications this dichotomy has for the current democratic media system. Twitter has shown to elevate the voices of elites, such as politicians and journalists, who are strongly represented on the platform. Nevertheless, the most conspicuous group in the 'Twittersphere', taking part in political debates, is anonymous users (Larsson & Moe, 2012: 741). In Sweden and Germany, this elite focus is certainly higher than in Spain, where Twitter is used more widely among the public (cf. Reuters Digital News Report). Twitter, with its possibility to spread short messages (limited to 140 characters) to a wide public of followers worldwide is a space where a public debate on the same issue takes

place at the same time, maybe using the information presented by said journalism immediately, spreading it, debating it, using it as a source or facilitating it in whatever way. As it is innate to social media, Twitter amalgamates the characteristics and functions of a social medium, as a disseminator of content, as well as a social network, designed as a communicative and interactive platform (Altheide & Schneider, 2013: 103).

## 7.4. Data Collection

The articles were retrieved and downloaded through different databases. For the Swedish newspapers, *Mediearkivet* was used. For the German newspapers, FAZ had to be collected from ProQuest, whereas SZ and Handelsblatt were retrieved from *Factiva*. The Spanish papers were retrieved through *Factiva* as well. Articles were found by applying the same search terms throughout the databases, equivalent in the different languages. The keywords were: *climate crisis*, *climate change*, *climate summit*, *climate conference*, *climate protection*, and *climate emergency*.<sup>2</sup> It has to be noted, that some restrictions were made due to availability. Some of the Swedish outlets are presented in the printed press edition, the rest of the articles are used in their online edition. This was accepted, as the content is generally the same, the online news texts are often just slightly shortened versions of the press editions. The results for articles on the declaration of the climate emergency were surprisingly few. In general, there was only one article per paper that covered this event. It is not clear if Factiva preselects articles in the search process. For Germany, 14 *FAZ* articles, eight *Handelsblatt* articles, and 12 *SZ* articles made the final selection, after a first read, a selection after a minimum word count of 100 words, and the elimination of editorials and opinion pieces. In total, this makes for 34 articles analyzed for Germany. For the Spanish papers, the same criteria were applied and 10 articles chosen for *El Mundo*, 13 for *El Pais*, and eleven for *Expansion*, which makes for a total of 34 articles for the Spanish case. For the Swedish financial paper *Dagens Industri*, only five articles could be used, which is due to the relatively marginal amount of articles published to the topic by this paper. From *Dagens Nyheter* eight articles were chosen and ten for *Svenska Dagbladet*, which contributes to a total of 23 Swedish articles, making for a total of 91 articles

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<sup>2</sup> **Swedish:** *klimatkris*, *klimatförändring*, (*klimatmöte*, *klimatoppmöte*.) *klimatkonferens*, *klimatskydd*, *klimatnödläge*;  
**German:** *Klimakrise*, *Klimawandel*, *Klimagipfel*, *Klimakonferenz*, *Klimaschutz*, *Klimanotstand*;  
**Spanish:** *crisis climática*, *cambio climático*, *cumbre climática*, *conferencia climática*, *protección del clima*, *emergencia climática*

in this analysis. The varying amount of articles is noted as a possible bias for analysis. Since the focus is on qualitative analysis of frames, this difference is believed to be made up for by the method used. At first, the research design included the analysis of one tabloid for each country. A tabloid culture, such as the Swedish press has with *Aftonbladet* and Germany with its *Bild Zeitung* is foreign to the Spanish media landscape. For the comparison of these three countries, the analysis of tabloids therefore had to be dropped.

## 7.5. Choice of Timeframe

The time frame for the press analysis was chosen from November 28, 2019, until December 15, 2019, as two important events took place in this short period. On November 28, the European Parliament voted to declare a climate and environmental emergency in Europe and globally, a symbolic act that acknowledges the importance of immediate action toward climate change mitigation and adaptation. The week after, the 2019 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP25) took place in Madrid. These two events promised to be of high interest for reporting as well as public engagement and discussion online. Furthermore, 2019 was a year, when climate change was high on the media and public agenda. Therefore this timeframe was picked for the analysis, underlining the choice of countries, which all had a "national stake" in the reporting. For Sweden, the world-famous climate activist Greta Thunberg is of importance, as she sailed from the US to attend the conference in Madrid and was named the year's most influential person by the Times magazine during that week. For the German press, the native new president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, presented her Green Deal, and for Spanish media, the conference was of importance as it took place in its capital, Madrid. What needs to be noted, is that climate conferences present issue-specific events of high political importance, with the reporting therefor being temporarily condensed (Wozniak et al. 2017: 1446). Research found that the United Nations climate change conferences are in the spotlight of global attention, provide comparable working conditions, and equal access to information for journalists (Eide et al., 2017). This had shown to allow the homogenization of frames used throughout the international media (Lück et al., 2018). In the following, the data collection, processing, and analysis shall be described and discussed towards shortcomings.

## 7.6. Twitter Framework

For the Twitter analysis, some technical difficulties had to be overcome. As it was impossible to retain data in a format that would allow an analysis of the country of origin of the user, when applying search filters for the set time frame, and the number of tweets exceeded the frame for this thesis, restrictions had to be made. Research has shown, that the lingua franca on the platform is English (Hänksa & Bauchowitz, 2019). Despite the tools applicable for this study and despite the help of the Twitter API used to specify the search tools, a search restriction to countries could not be achieved. Therefore, a compromise had to be made, to facilitate three individual searches, each in the official language of the three analyzed countries, Spanish, German, and Swedish. Other than for the Swedish context, we can be assured, that this does not solve the problem of defining country lines, as Spanish is the second most spoken language in the world and the official language for 20 countries and German is spoken in at least 4 countries. After several different approaches and combinations of search terms, it was decided to however go forward with this approach, as flawed as it may be, and apply a careful selection when looking at hints about countries in these two languages, for example when hashtags giving clues to countries of origin were applied or governments were called out by name. The search terms were applied in a general matter so that the mention of the term could appear as a hashtag or regularly in the tweet. The search was further restricted to focus on the 28th of November and the following day, as the discussion around this symbolic act of the European Parliament promised a focus on Europeanization of the debate. As this restricted the analysis towards the declaration of the climate emergency, this was the search term applied in each language. For Sweden, "klimatnödläge", in German "Klimanotstand" and "emergencia climática" in the Spanish case. It might be the case that the analysis includes tweets that do not stem from the countries included in the analysis. This is accepted, as the reason for the analysis of tweets is to analyze the public discourse around climate and the relations between the printing press and social media. The hope of being able to gain knowledge on a trans-national European conversation on Twitter had to be disappointed consequently. Therefore, no conclusions about the nature of a transnational public sphere on Twitter can be drawn. It is not necessary, nor feasible to restrict the analysis to national borders, as that does not reflect the way social discourse is held on digital platforms. Further, the originality of the Twitter users' identity can not be accounted for.

## 7.7. Coding & Analysis

The qualitative research tool *NVivo* facilitated the analysis. All articles were downloaded in their language of origin as PDF files and coded by hand in the program. A systematic approach was taken, as all articles have been evaluated by the same instrument and standards, explained in the following.

The first round of coding focused on the definitions of Berglez for space, power, and identity, with interest added by the author. These notions were understood as frame-categories. A focus was put on European themes, as a European Outlook is looked at in particular. Hence, European representations of identity, interest, power, and space are at the center of attention. If, for example, an article read the line "We here in Europe do things differently than in the US", identity and space would have been coded by highlighting the passage and saving it in a so-called 'node', a 'folder' that automatically saves all excerpts coded under the same title. The following excerpt includes a plethora of frames, representing different notions of identity, interest, power, and space. This shows that one meaning unit, namely the article, can hold several units of analysis. In this passage, the word choice of "the Europeans" as one 'imagined tribe' is coded under the frame category identity. This framing device hints to a common identification with Europe hence is coded under the identity-frame: "The EU as an imagined community".

	Identity: The EU as imagined community
Space: European North vs European East	"But <b>the Europeans</b> are apparently making only moderate progress in climate protection so far. Also on Tuesday the development organisation Germanwatch presented its climate protection index, which assesses both climate policy and progress in reducing emissions. <b>Sweden, Denmark and Great Britain are well ahead</b> in the index. However, <b>countries such as Poland, Hungary, Slovenia and Czechia are at the bottom of the ranking.</b> "We see very <b>big differences in the EU,"</b> said Germanwatch CEO Christoph Bals. <b>These differences are also likely to make it more difficult to agree on more ambitious climate policies.</b> Germany comes in 23rd place out of the 58 countries studied - four places higher than last year. EU emissions did fall slightly. But the current climate policy assessed the study as "moderate". The German contribution to climate protection remains too small. However, Schulze sees things quite differently. With the climate package, <b>the German government has laid "the right foundation for climate protection",</b> she told the plenary. In addition, she also promised <b>another 30 million euros for the so-called adaptation fund.</b> It is to help poor countries to adapt to the consequences of climate change. <b>Germany is the largest donor to the fund."</b> (SZ, <i>Hehre Ziele; In Madrid stellt sich die EU an die Spitze der Klima-Retter. Eine Studie sagt anders</i> , 11.12.2019)
Interest: National conflict of interest	
Interest: Economic interest: opportunity	
Identity: Germany as European leader	

Fig.2: Illustration of the coding process of news articles

After going through all the news articles, deducting representations of identity, interest, power, and space, the second round of coding was started. Here, I looked at the passages coded earlier and tried to find frames, common storylines, expressed through these frame devices such as metaphors, word choice, and the such. For instance, one repeating theme was to compare the EU and other actors, as can be seen in the used example. This was then coded as another node and applied to passages facilitating the same underlying storyline of, 'the EU versus Others' which is hence defined as a frame. These were not necessarily bound to only one frame category like interest but appeared throughout these notions. In the example used above, identity and space are framed in the same way, by the storyline/frame of "EU vs Others". Often, these are rather latent in nature, for example when expressed through tone, or the presentation of a climate goal followed by the status quo, which often implicates an interest for climate action to be taken more urgently, coded for example as the climate urgency frame. The frames are often rather underlying and discreet.

For the Twitter content, tweets had to be copied directly from Twitter and put into a word document, which was then imported to NVivo where the same approach was taken, although representations of identity, interest, power, and space per se were scarcely found. Similarities became apparent, especially regarding common themes and content of the tweets looked at. Very subtle parallels could be drawn, when someone, for example, referred to their frustration about the symbolic act of the climate emergency in comparison to lacking climate policies. This urgency of action is parallel to an interest-frame applied in the press. These comparisons were made in the analysis later on. Out of ethical reasons and in order to ensure the privacy of the Twitter users quoted in this thesis, they are referred to in a numerical way, such as "Twitter User 1,.. " out of ethical reasons. A codebook was automatically created through NVivo as the coding proceeded.




Fig.3: Illustration of Coding Process Twitter

As Figure 3 illustrates, tweets were coded after the same scheme as the news articles. It was harder to detect actual frames applied in the tweets, which is why a more interpretative analysis was facilitated for Twitter, looking into the overall tone and thematic in the tweets. For example, in the tweet represented here, apart from the frames that translated from the news media content, a notion of frustration with the policy of the EU to declare a climate emergency can be noted. The direct answer to a tweet from an MP of the Green Party also shows a rather direct tone towards the politician, as well as an identification of Sweden as a climate leader, in particular in comparison with poorer countries.

For the analysis, these conglomerations of framing devices under the frame categories were looked at and summarized as different frames, with the most showing examples being extracted and translated into English by the author. Further, the results were put against each other, in order to see which frames are used most prominently in each country. Consequently, a closer look towards the degree of European outlook that is implied in the frames was taken and compared between the countries. These results shall be presented in the following, after a short discussion about methodological restrictions and shortcomings of the analysis.

## **7.8. Restrictions & Shortcomings**

After having touched on a few shortcomings of the method per se, it has to be underlined that restrictions on what kind of knowledge this method can provide have to be clarified. The qualitative approach does give a more open look at the content and cultural background on frames applied. The social constructionist view on framing does not go into detail on what use of words arises how often, but rather in what way and in what context they do and how they interact with existing cultural concepts. A comparison between the newspaper content and the social media content is restricted to frames that could be discovered in the few articles that concern the parliaments' announcement of the climate emergency, however some frames overlapped with the content of other climate reporting concerning later points in time. As tweets often did not show clear framing devices in the lines of said frame categories, they were analyzed further. They showed rather latent reflections of frames used in the news as well as completely different and own characteristics. A national outlook, for example, could be seen in nearly all tweets, focusing on national politicians, national issues or stances in climate action.

Criticism of the symbolic character of the climate emergency declaration was found throughout all countries. This was often accompanied by an underlying frustration with the EU and its political processes. These findings do not fit into the frame categories established and were hence coded distinct from the categories.

### **Validity & Quality**

The focus on language and reasoning devices underlines the focus on the interpretation of the analyst. These interpretations are based on theoretical understandings outlined earlier in this thesis and accounted for by the reception of textual representations. As the levels of specificity might vary along the excerpts, quotations are used in full to point out where the identification with each reasoning device was carried out. As the conclusions drawn from the analysis are backed up by a broad theoretical framework, the argument often connected to qualitative content analysis, to be interpretive can be accounted for without hurting the quality of the research. Other than a quantitative approach, the qualitative nature of this study allows to see the "world as it is" as an ever-changing, complex reality, that is hard to put into numbers. Allowing a variety of perspectives, applied through the qualitative analysis of frames, the strong point of this study lies in its interpretative nature. Regarding its close connection to cultural observations, the method chosen is believed to be the best fit to retrieve knowledge about the presented topic.

## **8. Results**

In this part of the thesis, the results of the analysis are presented and interpreted. After an overview of the general characteristics of the news reporting, the framing categories *Identity*, *Interest*, *Power*, and *Space* are analyzed. First, each general category is outlined, presenting the frames discovered under each of these, facilitated through framing devices. Thereafter, the analysis of the different countries towards this specific frame category shall follow. The results of the Twitter analysis can be found subsequently.

## **Climate Change in the News in November/December 2019**

When looking at the data, it was very obvious that the majority of content focused around the UNFCCC Climate Change Conference in Madrid. More than a third of the news articles thematized the conference, with 35 out of 91 news articles in the sample, covering the issue. The declaration of the climate emergency, on the other hand, got very little coverage, as only eight articles thematize the latter. In the German press coverage, the Green Deal was nearly covered as extensively as the climate conference, with only one article less, followed by a general interest in EU climate politics. The climate emergency declaration and climate change, in general, got significantly less coverage in the German press. Ursula von der Leyen and high ranking EU politicians were actors covered predominantly, German economic and scientific institutions take another spotlight as actors in this sample. In Spain, more than half of the articles covered the COP25, with the other half covering climate change and its consequences mostly, as well as EU climate politics, the climate emergency, and the green deal. As actors who got most coverage, Antonio Guterres was quoted frequently, but a general focus on the Spanish people was striking. In the Swedish press coverage, the focus was spread more evenly. COP25 and climate politics were the most salient in the news. These topics were looked at mostly from a national standpoint. Further climate change in general and the emergency declaration got a lesser amount of coverage, with the green deal only being represented in one article. A strong focus on Greta Thunberg was seen throughout the Swedish coverage, not only in connection to the COP25. National politicians were highlighted more than EU politicians in general.

### **8.1. European Identity, Interest, Power and Space in the News Media**

In the mediated coverage of climate change in general and more precisely of events that involve climate-related decision making on a European level, the notions of identity, interest, power, and space are represented by different framing devices which in sum define a frame, understood as an unfolding storyline about an issue or a general organizing principle, making a certain interpretation of the issue described more likely. As the frame categories, identity, interest, power, and space, which describe a European Outlook are interrelated and somewhat fluent, they are often connected and represented in the same communicative bloc, which makes the difficulty to define "Europe", or rather "the EU" apparent. European Identity, therefore, has to

be regarded as a super-frame, as interest-, power-, and space - frames are often involved in achieving identification with Europe, or the EU, which is in turn defined by its common interest, its political power, and its geographic space. In the following, the frame categories are going to be described towards their general characteristics, as well as the frames that occur under these categories. Further, the framing devices that account for this specific frame and the storylines used are subject of analysis. After each frame category, an analysis towards the specific use in the press of the different countries shall follow. The analysis of Twitter rounds up the chapter.

### **8.1.1. Identity Frames**

Under the category of identity, a focus is put on the construction of a European identity. Nevertheless, all aspects that connect to identity will be taken into consideration. The frames that illuminate identities are explained in the following. As stated earlier, many identities can exist parallel and in no conflict with each other. This often posits the national identity in relation to the EU, creating layers or levels of collective identity. Sometimes, these identity 'interferences' delineate national from national or even European from another transnational, cumulative, or continental identity.

#### **Intersected Identities**

A few examples shall be given in the following:

"Europe will continue to have an important role to play. The next UN Climate Change Conference will also take place on the European continent, in Glasgow, Scotland, at the end of 2020. Prior to this, there will be a summit meeting between the EU and China in September 2020 under the German EU Council Presidency." (FAZ, *EU-Kommission vor dem großen Wurf*, 05.12.2019)

This quote shows how different layers of identity are often intertwined. In the first sentence, we see Europe depicted as a climate leader, underlined with the importance of the European continent as a space and then the distinction from China, as another big player in global politics paired with the comment that the EU Council Presidency is under the German, the national, lead. Not only do these different perspectives on identity often overlap but they are actually intertwined, acting on different "cognitive layers" (Gripsrud, 2007: 490). These sorts of representations do also crystallize the complex definition of "the EU". From political conglomerate, spatially, and in terms of political power, "the EU" can mean different things

that are often used interchangeably and parallel. The interplay of the different "layers of Europe" makes for an interesting ground of identification. Often we see partial identification, sometimes a mix of all layers of collective identity. This parallelism becomes clear when actions or interests are discussed:

"Several countries, including the EU and Sweden, feel that there has not been an agreement on Article 6 other than a bad one." (Dagens Nyheter, *Frustration och ilska präglade slutfasen av mötet i Madrid*, 15. 12. 2019)

Here the parallelism between a European and a national identity is expressed straightforward. This domestication of news is innate to media reporting still and occurs most prominently together with the "climate leadership" frame - not only do the texts then translate the global topic to a national discourse but add a layer of hegemony and distinction from other countries. Subtly, like mentioning the own country among actors who ask for more restrictions and actions towards climate change, or in distinct ways like the following:

"Europe wants to lead the way, and the EU will then, as always at climate conferences, be led by the current Council Presidency: Germany." (Süddeutsche Zeitung, *Biete Klimaschutz, nehme Geld*. 02.12.2019)

In this example, the axis of power is used for identification. The national leadership position within the EU is underlined, which is an interesting mechanism of strengthening both the identification with the nation-state as well as the national position within the EU and therefore creating a twofold identification platform. Further, the European identity is highlighted through manifesting its importance, as the national role and leading position within the EU is expressed. Adding to the positive image of the EU, the climate efforts, and acknowledging the severity of the crisis, the willingness to enable grand amounts of financial means and adapting policies is - again - often delineated against other countries' unwillingness to do so.

This is a result that goes hand in hand with findings of previous research, is the representation of identities on multiple levels (Olausson, 2009). The expression of both national identity, often paired with pointing out achievements or leadership characteristics of the nation-state, and European identity, as described above are set next to each other. Identification processes that the reader might subconsciously activate are happening on both a national level and on a European level.

## **EU vs. Others - Frame**

As we look at the different media texts, various ways in which identities are represented and created can be made out. Both national identity as well as a European identity could be noted in the data. A European identity is reflected by drawing distinctions to other global leaders, such as China, the U.S., or developing countries. This storyline holding "us", the EU, the "good guys", against "the other", resurfaced throughout the data. The antagonistic framing of "us vs them", reassuring a feeling of common belonging distinguished against the contour of "the other" is a familiar frame, that is quite typical for the mediated construction of identities, as well as climate change reporting (cf. Olausson, 2009; Shehata & Hopman, 2012). In the realms of climate change reporting, especially the efforts of the EU to combat climate change are often compared to other countries.

"And the intention of the UN and the European bloc is that this text urges countries to present more ambitious plans to cut emissions from 2020. However, this other bloc of developing countries advocates delaying that moment. In fact, India has already announced that it does not intend to do so until 2023." (El País, *Tensa recta final de las negociaciones en la COP25*, 13.12.2019)

As this article, in particular, focuses on the COP25, "the European bloc" is delineated against developing countries, whose ambitions in cutting emissions to combat climate change are not as high. It is notable, that the frame of putting the "EU" against "the other" concerning climate efforts is mostly apparent in the reporting related to COP25. This also applies to countries within the EU, especially in the East. These internal disagreements and struggles take a broad amount of the coverage analyzed, often combined with expressing the complicated bureaucracy of the EU and ways in which these conflicts are solved. As these internal struggles concern somewhat of an "east-west" divide within the EU and this study only looks at the "western" coverage, the framing showed an extent of homogenization that might have been different with a mixed selection of western- and eastern European countries. This homogenization of frames during the UN climate conference has been noted by some studies before (Lück et al.: 2018; Reese: 2008).

## **Europe as an Imagined Community - Frame**

Under this frame, a European identity is probably expressed in the most straight forward way, as the EU as a whole is referred to. This is often achieved again through delineating it against others, which makes this frame often latently subsumed in the frame of EU vs Others,

presenting specific versions of the former. The European identity is expressed through the reference to a commonly shared fate, which points towards the imaginary of a community. In these examples, the national is connected to the EU.

The European representation of identity became apparent in the frequency of referring to Europeans as one group. Again, functioning on different levels, the European political elite, as well as the public, were referred to with this. A common understanding of the "togetherness" which climate change facilitates as it ignores national borders is expressed in a manner that underlines the shared problem and the need for solutions.

"The European partners finally managed to overcome the resistance of the reluctant countries, with the promise, among other things, of a transition fund that aims to mobilise up to 100 billion euros." (El País, *La UE pacta el objetivo de emisiones cero para 2050*, 13.12.2019)

Also in critical formulations, a common identity is expressed through the use of the pronoun 'we':

"In Europe we talk a lot, but do little." (El País, *Tiempo de actuar*, 06.12.2019)

In another example, "Europe" is used as a representation of one public, suggesting a "European public":

"Europe is accompanying with a cry of alarm the ambitious agenda with which it intends to combat the worrying deterioration of the environment." (El País, *El Parlamento Europeo declara la "emergencia climática"*, 29.11.2019)

Again the different layers of Europe are represented, and "Europeans" are referred to on different levels.

"In reality, the Europeans made a far from modest appearance at the UN Climate Change Conference COP25." (FAZ, *EU-Kommission vor dem großen Wurf*, 05.12.2019)

That these representations of European identities are somewhat banal can be illuminated in the contrast to the statements of high-ranking EU officials, in this example, commission president Ursula von der Leyen, who does make use of antagonistic rhetoric, the European common standard and identification and the different layers of transnational, national and local:

"'Youth is on the European side', said von der Leyen. Young people feel connected to Europe, but also to their country, their city and their village. 'Just like my parents' generations, we must now take responsibility to defend the European way.' It is not

market- or state-oriented, but people-oriented, she said, alluding to the United States and China." (FAZ, *Neue Geldquelle für Europa*, 30.11.2019)

Olausson (2009) describes the European identity as a 'fetus', as the national identity, not only facilitated by strong domestication within journalism, often overpowers the notion of a European identity as the "identity by default". Further, she describes a more naturalized European identity,

"which turns the EU into a legitimate political power in relation to climate change. Analogous to the 'banal nationalism' (Billig 1995) in the climate reporting that upholds national identity, there also seems to evolve some kind of 'banal Europeanism' – an identity constructed more or less beyond the horizon of awareness. The European identity position is common-sensical in character, 'hidden' as the natural order of things, and has to some extent turned into a discursive 'habit'" (Olausson, 2009: 22).

I want to argue though, that since Olausson's study from 2009, we can see a development towards the European identity becoming more intertwined with the national and more active amid global issues like climate change. Although a focus in reporting on differences between the member countries is noted, an overarching theme of "Europeanness" pervades even these reports. Notably, a somewhat strong Europeanization of the discourse on climate change can be made out. This finding is to be critically assessed, against its background and time of retrieval. Further, a quantitatively broader section of framing devices alludes to the doubts towards the EU as a fitting political realm to solve climate change, concerning the difficulty to find consent and complicated bureaucracy.

### **EU as a Climate Leader - Frame**

The EU is further reported on as taking the role of a "climate leader", a frame detected most prominently in the reporting on the declaration of the climate emergency, where mentions about its pioneer role and the "climate leader" frame are more evident. The EU's ambition and efforts taken to combat climate change are again put into comparison to other actors frequently and mentioned positively. No matter the country of comparison, the EU is mentioned as a powerful global player, that includes not only strong individual states but a political leadership that defends the EU's spot as a "leader" on several occasions.

"The EU is part of the group of member states who asked for much stronger formulations earlier." (Svenska Dagbladet, *Låst läge på klimatmötet: Det är totalt oacceptabelt*, 15.12.2019)

Some articles get even more explicit about the leadership position the EU likes to present itself in, connected to a critical presentation of inner-European relationships:

"The EU likes to spread the image of itself as leaders in the climate change adaption. But Member States are quarreling internally about the level of ambition and the EU summit this week determines whether the Union can send an unanimous signal to the UN climate summit in Madrid." (Dagens Industri, *EU's toppar möts om klimatmål*, 09.12.2019)

Apart from these frames, a closer look into the frame category *identity* in the different countries shall follow, emphasizing country-specific frames.

### **8.1.2. Identity in the National Media Contexts**

The frame category of identity captures different combinations of relations from countries to the EU. These are, by all means, not the same in the analyzed countries. In Germany, a European identity somewhat contains a rather silent national identity but puts the national on top of the EU, which leads to a strong identification with the latter. In Sweden, a strong national identity is expressed against an inferior Europe, whereas in Spain, both identities seem to flourish, with an expression of eagerness to identify as European. Sweden stands out against its European partners, Spain and Germany, as it seems to have taken a step away from the EU in the news coverage. The Swedish native Greta Thunberg, who was nominated as the person of the year by the Times magazine during the time of analysis, took a great deal of media attention in the Swedish printing press. Her unusual commute by boat to the Madrid conference was also a topic extensively focused on in the Swedish media. Further, the press has seemed to favor a national outlook on climate change reporting, even when dealing with EU politics. Identity is mostly represented by national interpretations of the such. It is anchored strongly in a climate leadership role and common interest frames of the country. A European identity is rather abstained from in the coverage of climate change in the Swedish press when the EU is connected to strong leadership within the climate debate, an identification rather takes place based on a shared interest, as in this example, higher ambitions.

#### **Swedish Distance from EU - Frame**

"The EU, the group of which Sweden is a member of, declared that it was impossible to accept a document which did not contain a strong statement about higher ambitions

and the need for countries to update and strengthen their national commitments for the next years." (Dagens Nyheter, *Frustration och ilska präglade slutfasen av mötet i Madrid*, 15.12.2019)

The rather hesitant identification with the EU backs the unwillingness to accept low climate commitments from other countries. The tone in which the membership of Sweden to the EU is described does underline a frustration in the world's climate efforts. The same frustration is expressed with the reporting on the COP25 negotiations, called "a fiasco":

"For nearly two weeks the world's countries have tried to come to an agreement over a new climate agreement here, but around 10 pm on Saturday the negotiations seemed to come close to a fiasco instead." (Svenska Dagbladet, *Låst läge på klimatmötet: "Det är totalt oacceptabelt"*, 15.12.2019)

Further, somewhat frustrated tones about a European unity are noted. The debate about the German word choice and translation of the climate emergency is combined with a comment on the several languages within the EU, pointing out a threshold to European unity and identification, as the lack of an official language is often lamented.

"But nuances have shown a tendency to be lost in translation between the EU's more than 20 languages. In English, there is a difference between "urgency", and "emergency". In German this is more delicate. The word "Notstand" awakens the uncomfortable sense of Article 48 of the Weimar Republic's constitution, which Adolf Hitler put into place to take over power in 1933." (Dagens Industri, *Slak lina för von der Leyen*, 28.11.2019)

On the other hand, the Swedish press showed a rather national outlook, reflected by the storyline of Sweden as a climate leader.

### **Sweden as a Climate Leader - Frame**

Connected to the domestication of news, a strong frame of Sweden as a climate leader, not only within the EU but globally becomes clear. Headlines like: "Swedish experts: We can speak of a climate emergency now" (Dagens Nyheter, 13.12.2019) underline the notion of the country's strong belief in its leadership position and its expertise in climate science. This promotes a strong national identification based on the nation's climate interests, which often interrelates the two notions in the same excerpt.

On the same notion, Germany applied a "leadership frame" quite frequently, but did so in relation to Europe. Germany's strong stance within the European Union, not so much defined over their climate efforts, could be reconstructed.

When looking at the overall representations of Europeanization and European Unity, the German press most frequently applies frames that underline this. Germany's role in the EU leadership is highlighted, as well as the EU, their experts, and officials are taken as reference points. In the German press, members of the political elite, politicians, members of the European parliament, and such are quoted more frequently, their Europe-centric language and formulations are adopted. However, Germany's relatively high emissions and the largely coal focused industry are rarely thematized. Further, the fact that Germany ranks third of the countries most affected by climate change is scarcely subject of reporting, unlike in the Spanish press.

### **Germany as European Leader - Frame**

This article shows, how the manifestation of the view of Germany as a mediating force within the European Union bridges the gap between rich and poor countries and manifests its place at the very top of the EU. This is mainly manifested through the description of its economic force, and a "solidarity" towards EU members with weaker economies.

"With the climate package, the German government has laid "the right foundation for climate protection", she told the plenary. In addition, she also promised another 30 million euros for the so-called adaptation fund. It is to help poor countries to adapt to the consequences of climate change. Germany is the largest donor to the fund." (SZ, *Hehre Ziele; In Madrid stellt sich die EU an die Spitze der Klima-Retter. Eine Studie sagt anders*, 11.12.2019)

Further, a European Identity was established through the reporting under the frame of Europe as an imagined community.

### **Europe as Imagined Community - Frame**

The use of wordings like 'the Europeans' in the excerpt above manifests a European Identity towards an imagined community of Europe.

"But the Europeans are apparently making only moderate progress in climate protection so far." (SZ, *Hehre Ziele; In Madrid stellt sich die EU an die Spitze der Klima-Retter. Eine Studie sagt anders*, 11.12.2019)

The same frame was apparent in the Spanish coverage. In the Spanish media, very literal expression of a European identity were found. Through formulations like "In Europe we talk a

lot, but do little." (El País, *Tiempo de actuar*, 06.12.2019) or using phrases like "The European partners" (El País, *La UE pacta el objetivo de emisiones cero para 2050*, 13.12.2019) a stressing of European unity is created, in which Spain takes its 'rightful place' among the "powerhouses" like Germany and France.

In the Spanish context, a strong focus on identification with the EU can be noted. A harsher tone towards the failure of EU countries to cut emissions and a relatively negative view of the chances of climate actions are expressed. The country's efforts in fulfilling EU standards, especially in comparison with Germany are often underlined, consolidating the EU as a framework for political action towards climate change.

### **Spanish Relations with European Leaders - Frame**

"According to the Council of European Energy Regulators, Spain provided more incentives than Germany during the hardest years of the crisis and is still among the European champions of the effort, despite being among the top three with the highest electricity prices." (El Mundo, *España llega a la COP25 con 250.000 millones a las renovables No sólo por Florentino ¿Gurú de la repetición? La CNMC y REE*; 01.12.2019)

In direct comparisons, the Spanish press confirms its strong efforts towards climate action, despite their economically difficult stance. By mentioning Spain among the two founding countries of the EU, France, and Germany, the Spanish press tries to consolidate Spain's position as a central part of the EU while simultaneously presenting the troubles the EU is facing with agreeing about emissions.

"But, again, four of the big five emitters, which account for more than 60% of all greenhouse gases on the planet, are missing: the US - which has already begun the process of leaving the Paris Agreement -, China, India and Russia. The fifth actor in this block of large emitters is the European Union, which does not figure as such in this coalition either, since Brussels and the Twenty-Eight are still negotiating how and how much the plan to cut emissions that they are going to present to the UN in the framework of the Paris Agreement in 2020 should be toughened. Germany, France and Spain are part of the commitment launched in September in New York." (El País, *Los países más emisores rechazan endurecer sus recortes de CO2*, 12.12.2019)

Further, a Spanish-German relationship is sketched by pointing out von der Leyen's nationality.

"And the new European Commission headed by Germany's Ursula von der Leyen - whose first official trip will be precisely to the Spanish capital to attend and speak at the event - is going to get going equipped with a powerful green programme under the

label of the so-called Green Deal." (El País, *El Parlamento Europeo declara la "emergencia climática"*, 29.11.2019)

### **8.1.3. Interest - Frames**

The next focus point for this analysis was to see in what ways and to what extent there were "European interests" reflected in the mediated content if there were common positions and how they are expressed. A few observations will be analyzed in the following. The most common amongst the "interests" frame is accounted for by a large number of articles regarding the COP25, where the reporting characteristically focuses on the different positions and viewpoints of the countries as well as the politics of the conference. This is inherent to the reporting of climate conferences (Lück et al., 2018) and does influence and maybe even distort the result of this analysis. It shall however still be taken into consideration, as it is a form of expressing interests and connects to the frames used in articles and mediated content outside of the conference reporting. Further, and maybe not surprisingly, interests like the economic burdens of climate action are discovered. The impacts on national economies and to some extent actions of companies and branches were discussed throughout the material. Mitigation and adaption - characteristic for climate change reporting - were overarching themes that reoccurred.

#### **Economic Interests - Frame**

Within the economic interests frame, different directions could be made out. First of all, the economic interest frame was often seen combined with a typical domestication of EU politics, as these economic interests were divided into frames of national economic burden or opportunities. The effects of EU policies on national economies were at the center of this frame.

Related to the consequences of climate change, the financial burden, and how it is carried are seen throughout the data.

"Germanwatch estimates the total amount of damage caused by extreme weather conditions at around 4.5 billion euros for 2018 - mainly due to hurricane losses. "Consequences of extreme weather such as droughts, floods or heat waves lead to fatalities and major damage in this country as well," says Maik Winges, one of the index's authors. Only Japan and the Philippines were even more severely affected by extreme weather in 2018 than Germany." (Handelsblatt, *Studie zum Klimawandel; Hitzetote in Deutschland*, 05.12.2019)

In the excerpt above, a national focus is taken, as the country's financial burden is pointed out and its severe climate risk to be affected by climate change is connected to a financial interest. A focus of reporting on the opportunity through the financial strength of the European Investment Bank, as the central European financial institution is another reflection of interest seen throughout all three countries when the economy of climate change is covered.

"The European Investment Bank (EIB), the largest multilateral institution financing loans for investments that contribute to EU objectives, is consolidating its position as a major climate bank. Its Vice-President, Emma Navarro, reiterated yesterday, at a round table in the Spanish Pavilion, the EIB's commitment to stop financing projects linked to fossil fuels (oil, coal and gas) from the end of 2021 and to mobilise one billion euros to fight climate change until 2030, in what is considered "the critical decade" for cutting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions." (Expansion, *La financiación de los bancos, clave para la transición climática*, 10.12.2019)

Referring to the EIB, a central organ in the managing of climate change and its economic impacts connects back to a shared interest of combating the costs of climate change and sharing investments and financial burdens on a European level to relieve national economies. Economic conditions in general and the unconformity between the member states showcases the common economic interest frame.

"The disparity of economic conditions between the members complicates the adoption of common projects such as climate neutrality, foreseen in the draft conclusions of the summit in the form of a reduction to zero of net CO2 emissions in 2050." (El País, *La financiación complica el pacto europeo sobre el clima*, 13.12.2019)

### **National Conflicts of Interest - Frame**

As a generic frame, applied to the issue of climate change, the conflict frame is expressed in the representations of interests. Conflicting interests between European member states, often along economic potency are reoccurring in the data. The emphasis on the impact of "economic disparity between the countries" is often combined with another interest frame, which points out the concurring interests of EU member states in their efforts to combat climate change. Again, this is a frame commonly seen among the reporting of the COP25.

"In addition to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were against an ambitious 2050 target. German Chancellor Angela Merkel advocated a climate-neutral Europe in 2050. "That would be a strong signal," she said. The new President of the EU Council, Charles Michel, stressed that climate neutrality is a very important goal. However, the starting conditions in the various EU states must be taken into account. Diplomats said that in the end an agreement would depend on the financial commitments made by the

other states Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic." (FAZ, *Aufbruch im Mäuseschritt*, 13.12.2019)

As the climate conference in Madrid did struggle to find an agreement by the end of the time frame and was extended by one day, the central topic of its reporting was, of course, the reason for that, the disagreement between other member states of the Visegrad axis. That this politicum is a central point of reflecting diverse interest within the EU and communicate some sense of disagreement and division is a natural effect. This surfaces in other places, when formulations like the following underline the diverging interests within the EU.

"Other Member States are ready to decide if EU funds should go to regions which are particularly sensitive to climate change. This majority of countries does not want to interfere with negotiations on the forthcoming EU budget for 2021-2027, which will also be discussed at the final review on Friday. It is therefore Charles Michel's difficult task to find a compromise." (Dagens Nyheter, *Greenpeace sätter fyr på EU-toppmötet*, 13.12.2019)

Not only diverging views amongst member states are a frequent subject of reporting but also their different abilities and efforts to combat climate change.

"But the Europeans are apparently making only moderate progress in climate protection so far. Also on Tuesday the development organization Germanwatch presented its climate protection index, which assesses both climate policy and progress in reducing emissions. Sweden, Denmark and Great Britain are far ahead in the index. However, countries like Poland, Hungary, Slovenia and the Czech Republic are at the bottom of the ranking. "We see very big differences in the EU", said Germanwatch CEO Christoph Bals. These differences are also likely to make an agreement on ambitious climate policy more difficult." (SZ, *Hehre Ziele: In Madrid stellt sich die EU an die Spitze der Klima-Retter. Eine Studie sagt anders*, 11.12.2019)

### **Climate Urgency - Frame**

Moreover, not only within Europe but rather globally, an urgency to act is felt. The expression of pessimism goes further than the EU and includes the "international community" in the shared interest to lower the global temperature.

"The pessimism and need for urgency that the international community is increasingly feeling is backed by the latest UN estimates, which calculate that the planet is headed for a global temperature increase of 3.2 degrees Celsius, when what was agreed at the climate summit in the French capital at COP21 was a target of 1.5 degrees in 2030." (Expansion, *2019 cierra la peor década de calentamiento global*, 04.12.2019)

Little hope is left by presenting this urgency and the common interest to act in a way, that missing of the agreed target is almost inevitable.

"The UN warned last week of the widening emissions gap as a result of countries' ineffectiveness in the race to stop the climate crisis. The gap between what states must do (reduce emissions) and what they end up cutting is growing, making it almost impossible to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement." (Expansion, *2019 cierra la peor década de calentamiento global*, 04.12.2019)

A shared European interest to make the EU climate neutral, presented by the new commission is quoted by the commission's vice president as a goal that shall be followed by many. Again the EU portrays itself as a climate leader, who's interests are ambitious and inspiring for other states and leaders. Expressions like "a common goal" or alike are refrained from in the journalistic coverage throughout the countries.

"The decision from the EU's top meeting to make the EU climate-neutral by 2050 was approved by the coalition and called "historically". EU Commission's Vice President Frans Timmerman's partook in the meeting: - We must be ambitious if we want to achieve the long-term objectives. The meeting provided support for our plan to make the EU climate-neutral in 2050, which I hope will be followed by many. " (Dagens Nyheter, *Skärpt tonläge på Madridmötet*, 14.12.2019)

In a Marxist interpretation of interest, these representations can be thought of as European class values and interest, the financial frame should be looked at under the notion of solidarity. These pillars of solidarity and common interest make up the grounds the EU is built upon. The publicized debate around the willingness to contribute financially and to integrate policies to reduce carbon emissions go back to the shared interest of preventing a critical surpassing of the tipping points of global warming. The framing of the struggles within the EU to come to an agreement about their climate efforts and spending is critical to creating a European identity. It is through shared interests that collective identity is bound. This frame is also strongly connected to the political negotiations typical for a climate summit and thereby alleviated once put into perspective. The mediated representation of a common European interest to mitigate climate change is prevalent throughout the whole of the coverage looked at. Especially the climate emergency was framed often with expressions hinting towards Europe as the first continent to do so, the aim to become carbon neutral and the shared ambition to combat climate change. The four basic interests described by Wendt (1994) in the theory chapter find representation in the data. The "physical security" aspect concerns the impacts and effects of

climate change, already felt by especially central European countries through heatwaves. In choosing a financial angle to express the costs of the effects if no actions are taken and the immense financial aids put towards these issues reassure an active interest of the European Union to take this physical security seriously. Through the framing of Europe as a climate leader and their strong position in the world, the "recognition as an actor by others" is given as an interest reflected in the coverage. The interest of "development" and "ontological security", described as the "predictability in relationships to the world, which creates a desire for stable social identities", (Wendt, 1994: 385) are two 'basic interest' that are framed as "unfulfilled" or at least critical in the coverage. The development of working towards the Paris agreement and achieving the climate goals are somewhat given up and reported on as highly unlikely. Further, through the coverage of the failing of global leaders like the U.S. and "others" to not keep on track with their climate policies and promises and further the internal struggles between eastern and western European countries, I would argue that 'ontological security' is an interest, framed to be at risk. This by implication would risk a stable social identity, after Wendt. Therefore, the content on Twitter will be crucial to look at, as this conclusion can impossibly be drawn from the press material. It shall be noted that this conclusion may not be a given, as a majority of "interest frames" refer to shared European interests, and how a frame translates to the personal reception is dependent on several factors, personal experience, and communicative exchange. In the following, the country-specific framing of interest is outlined, pointing out the most prevalent frames identified in the coverage.

#### **8.1.4. Interest in the National Media Contexts**

What was striking, was the different focus on climate change adaption and mitigation in the different countries. Whilst in the Spanish coverage, a focus is put on mitigation, Swedish and German press often focus more on the adaption towards climate change.

##### **Climate Change Mitigation - Frame**

Spain's interest in taking more ambitious climate efforts are often pointed out and downplayed by stressing the parallelism to other country's tasks.

"Some of our EU partners are showing that growth can be achieved by net reductions in emissions. Spain, therefore, has to take the next step, which is to reduce emissions.

That is the challenge for Spain and for most countries in the world." (El Mundo, *COP 25: El tiempo para actuar se acaba por José Manuel Moreno*, 30.11.2019)

The people's climate efforts and awareness is another reoccurring theme in the Spanish press' coverage, often combined with putting these against other countries outside of the EU. The stressing of individual action and the awareness of Spanish people underlies the national interest in mitigating climate change.

"It is significant how quickly the immense majority of Spaniards (93% according to the survey published yesterday by this newspaper) have assumed the truth about global warming. This awareness does not correspond, however, to the decisions of governments and large corporations. The absence of the leaders of the United States and China in the COP25 reveals the fragility of the consensus reached." (El País, *Otra forma de vivir es necesaria*, 9.12.2019)

### **Climate Change Adaption - Frame**

It is interesting, that adaption, not mitigation is spoken of in Sweden.

"Swedish energy has unique preconditions to play a major role in the global climate change adaption," Ulf Kristersson, Ebba Busch Thor and Nyamko Sabuni wrote in the DN debate." (Svenska Dagbladet, *Liberalerna och SD i ny kärnkraftsfront*, 29.11.2019)

A shift between the "mitigation-centric" debates in the EU is contrasted by the Swedish economy and a focus towards adaption, implying a national interest further expressed by economic opportunity.

### **Sweden: Economic Opportunity - Frame**

"Swedish enterprises are so far in front in the climate adaption and have wished for Sweden to go even further. This will strengthen Sweden's brand', says Anna Hallberg." (Dagens Industri, *S vek sig för MP:s hårda klimatkrav*, 14.12.2019)

The clear positioning of Sweden's 'brand' as a climate leader surpasses the political realms. A focus on the Swedish industry as an important pillar of leadership and power solidify. Moreover, a very critical stance towards the EU's efficacy and spending can be made out.

The same frame is found in German coverage, where this is linked to European identity and outlook, rather than a national one.

### **Germany: Economic Opportunity - Frame**

"She also promised another 30 million euros for the so-called adaptation fund. It is to help poor countries to adapt to the consequences of climate change. Germany is the largest donor to the fund." (SZ, *Hehre Ziele; In Madrid stellt sich die EU an die Spitze der Klima-Retter. Eine Studie sagt anders*, 11.12.2019)

The conflict of interests and diverging economic abilities within Europe is focused on in the German coverage, however, always delineated against the German role as mediator in the EU.

### **Conflict of Interests within Europe - Frame**

"Sweden, Denmark and Great Britain are well ahead in the index. However, countries such as Poland, Hungary, Slovenia and Czechia are at the bottom of the ranking. "We see very big differences in the EU," said Germanwatch CEO Christoph Bals. These differences are also likely to make it more difficult to agree on more ambitious climate policies."(SZ, *Hehre Ziele; In Madrid stellt sich die EU an die Spitze der Klima-Retter. Eine Studie sagt anders*, 11.12.2019)

The different speeds in progress within the EU do not only create a conflict within the EU, effecting policymaking, but also express a spacial delineation between, again, Eastern and Western European countries.

## **8.1.5. Power - Frames**

The ways and extents to which topics and conflicts are explained as a mixture of domestic, national, and transnational powers are partly already covered in the sections above. More precisely, a few examples shall be presented which point out the distinct framing approaches to representations of power. Especially the technical questions of climate action give ground for discussions about EU wide policies.

### **European Legislative Power - Frame**

"In general, all EU legislation is to be oriented towards the goal of climate protection and then implemented with a mixture of incentives, aids and requirements." (FAZ, *Europas Mondfahrt*, 13.12.2019)

The representations of power are often very closely linked to the representations of interests, as the way in which forms of power, mostly political, are executed are based on interests, as expressed very literally in the excerpt above.

"Because domestic production of wind and solar energy cannot cover the future demand according to the BDI, an internationally oriented hydrogen strategy of the EU is urgently needed." (FAZ, *Wirtschaft warnt for "Green Deal"*, 12.12.2019)

In this passage, expert opinions are quoted to underline the need for regulations considering energy consumption and the importance of an international solution. The article covers the 'Green Deal' presented by the new EU commission, which is an issue where frames about power, especially in the European context can be detected multitudinously. As this example demonstrates, the "domestic" or national realms are not fitted for the vast demands of renewable energy, thus presenting the EU and its strategy as the more suitable legislative instance. The representations of power are also linked to the representations of European identity, specifically the notions that present the EU as a climate leader, mainly against its partners, which again goes back to putting the EU vs others. An underlying generic polarisation of the global North vs South takes place, as the EU is outlined against less ambitious parties.

"Even if Europe were to put an end to emissions, 91% of the rest of the world would still be left unresolved. The EU will introduce clauses in trade agreements to ensure its partners comply with the climate, and will launch a border mechanism for carbon that could take the form of a tax on imports." (El País, *La UE lanza su plan verde frente a la crisis climática*, 12.12.2019)

Details about the Green Deal and policy-making imply transnational legislation related to climate actions. Taking drastic measures to ensure compliance of partners suggest high political power and expresses a strong leadership.

"By law, she [von der Leyen, *author's note*] wants to oblige the EU to keep its promise to make Europe the first climate-neutral 'continent' by 2050." (FAZ, *EU Commission for dem großen Wurf*, 05.12.2019)

The communication of reliability of the EU to keep its promises and fulfill its leadership role on a global stage is enforced by quoting the president of the European Commission, von der Leyen. In relating to conflicts of other countries and actors and a growing 'chaos', which the EU positions itself as a proactive force, a 'geopolitical' player that works towards solutions.

"In this way von der Leyen wants to ensure that the EU develops a strong position within the world community instead of being a mere spectator in conflicts in the neighbourhood. The Commission should be a "geopolitical" one, which opposes the growing chaos in world politics." (Handelsblatt, *Europas neuer Weg*, 28.11.2019)

Apart from political power representations, Berglez (2013) defines power as "the capacity to implement a goal as well as a relation between institutions, groups, and individuals, which involves influence and/or distribution of resources" (2013: 38). This is to an extent already

covered in the "interests" section, as the strongest representation surrounded financial aid and distribution. Surely, representations about global governance and law enforcement covered in this section can be considered the more banal political power. Again, it is shown, how closely the concepts of identity, interests, power, and space are related. Olausson (2009) found that "the political power of the nation-state, whose legitimacy depends on the symbolic production of an imagined national community, is simultaneously nourished and supported. The nation-state as a representative of 'Us' is then given legitimacy as the relevant power in relation to changing climate" (2009:5). The same conclusion can be drawn from this analysis but on a European level. Europe, through presenting an imagined supra-national community, distinct from "the Others" gives legitimacy to the European Union as the relevant power to "manage" climate change with its resources and authority. It is frequently stressed, that the national realm might be powerful within the EU, but comes to its limits on solving the problem on a global scale.

### **Elitist vs Societal Power - Frame**

A focus on political elites in environmental reporting is noted by Shehata & Hopmann (2012), driving domestication towards a power axis, as national elite sources heavily rely on national elites. This is reflected in the "indexing theory" put forward by Bennett (1990), who states that if there is a consensus among the elite opinion, media reporting will "index" it, meaning news stories will represent the consensus of the elite, leaving little to no space for alternative actors and views to be featured in the debate (Shehata & Hopmann, 2012: 176 f.).

Wozniak et al. (2017) bring up a discussion on power in framing contests, which shall be briefly looked at in this instance. As Gamson and Modigliani (1989) claimed very early on, frames do not get selected by journalists by chance but are rather subject to journalistic agency and frame sponsors in society, which can be politicians or members of the public. As we see within the instance of this excerpt, media texts can become a stage for framing contests.

"UN Secretary General António Guterres is planning to address the plenary session of the climate conference in a few minutes, when the climate movement of the street meets the conference in Madrid in front of the entrance to Hall 10. Dozens of young activists throw themselves on the floor, they hit bottles and cups and shout: "We, the people, we want change." They demand more climate protection. The UN security forces allow the scene a few moments, then they form a chain, separate the turmoil from the spectators and force the demonstrators out of the exhibition hall into the open. In the end, about twenty security men in black stand like a wall in front of the gate. Other activists take pictures of it. Their message: while politicians promise their commitment to the climate, young people are thrown out." (FAZ, *Aufbruch im Mäuseschritt*, 13.12.2019)

In general, mainstream media coverage is mostly indexed to official sources (cf. Bennett, 1990) the framing contest 'won' by government official sources, often to the disadvantage of actors of civil society and other "alternative" sources. This holds true especially for international or global topics, as the communicative relations and resources and the government's inherent authority, or power, as a political decision-maker facilitate this dominance in the framing contest. Even though modern technology enables civil actors and 'alternative sources' to create their own channels without a gatekeeper or indexing issues, but still mediated public debate on policy issues prominently takes place in mainstream media coverage, presenting a high threshold for 'non-elite' actors to partake discursively (Wozniak et al, 2017: 1435).

In regard to the climate emergency declaration, a clash of reception among politicians and climate activists could be noted. By the personification of certain members of society, their voices suddenly stand against the "much talk - no actions" politicians, with science on the side of the former.

"'We don't want you to declare a climate emergency, but to act,' Vanessa Nakate, a Ugandan activist in the Thunberg-led Fridays for Future movement, told policymakers. Although the Madrid summit is a transitional event, over the next week countries will have a golden opportunity to be more ambitious and commit to presenting tougher plans to cut their greenhouse gas emissions. Manuel, 56, warned from the outset that there are 'a lot of reports and research centers' warning that the path now is not the right one. The science, and that is what the activists are arguing strongly, points out that the plans that the states have on the table will not be enough to keep the warming within non-catastrophic levels, so cut commitments are needed." (El País, *Miles de personas asumen el grito de Thunberg frente a la crisis climática*, 07.12.2019)

In the same journalistic piece, Greta Thunberg is quoted with a direct statement against "the leaders". This language is picked up by the report and underlined with the dramatization of this conflict as "the pressure from the streets".

"The leaders are betraying us. Enough is enough," she lamented at the end of the demonstration from the stage prepared by the organization. "Change is coming, whether you like it or not," she added about the pressure on the leaders from the streets. (El País, *Miles de personas asumen el grito de Thunberg frente a la crisis climática*, 07.12.2019)

## 8.1.6. Power in the National Media Contexts

### Europe as a Legitimate Realm for Climate Policies - Frame

As the anchoring of identity in a European identity is nearly overpowering in the Spanish coverage, representations of power, interest, and space are rather subordinated and immersed in these representations. In the following excerpt, for example, a strong belief in the legitimacy and ability of the EU to implement successful policies to mitigate climate change, such as the Green Deal is expressed, which can be interpreted as an underlying storyline of European as a powerful actor in combating the climate crisis.

"And the new European Commission headed by Germany's Ursula von der Leyen - whose first official trip will be precisely to the Spanish capital to attend and speak at the event - is going to get going equipped with a powerful green programme under the label of the so-called Green Deal." (El País, *El Parlamento Europeo declara la "emergencia climática"*, 29.11.2019)

The same frame is present in the German press coverage. By outlining a politically domesticated approval, the European Union is presented as the legitimate realm to combat climate change and introduce policies.

"Federal Environment Minister Svenja Schulze (SPD) praised the plan of the new EU Commission. She emphasized the signal effect of the 'Green Deal'. 'This is a clever, consistent overall concept', she said in Madrid. 'It puts climate and environmental protection where it belongs: at the heart of European policy.'" (FAZ, *Leyen: EU muss wieder Vorreiter im Umweltschutz werden*, 12.12.2019)

In the Swedish coverage, power is described very differently related to Europe. A disappointment in European policies is expressed, as well as a failure of the EU altogether.

### Failing of the EU - Frame

Apart from representations of national power, European power is covered under a negative notion prominently. A disappointment in EU political processes expresses this disappointment in its legitimization to handle the climate crisis.

"The European Parliament declares a climate emergency. This becomes clear after the leaders adopted a resolution on Thursday. But the resolution risks being just empty words without political content, critics say." (Dagens Nyheter, *Kritiker: EU:s klimatnödläge riskerar bli bara tomma ord*, 29.11.2019)

"The countries sit deep down in their trenches and hold on to their negotiating lines." (Svenska Dagbladet, *EU-mötet hotar att sluta i praktfiasko*, 13.12.2019)

An unwillingness to pay more to the EU household in order to be used for climate actions paired with the frame of Sweden as a climate leader gives an insight about a sense of, skepticism about the EU policy processes give fuel to the argument that Sweden is rather frustrated with European climate policy progress.

"Sweden and other 'thrifty' countries do not want to pay more to this, but it will as per usual end with a compromise - which often comes late." (Dagens industri, *Slak lina för von der Leyen*, 28.11.2019)

In the German press most strongly, a very different notion of power becomes apparent, as the same frame we see applied to identity finds representation in the power category.

### **Europe as a global leader - Frame**

Framing the EU as a strong leader is often achieved through stressing the presentation of the "Green Deal" and presenting leaders of the EU in a fairly positive light.

"The only real hope came on the first day of the conference with the appearance of the new Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. As a newcomer to climate protection, she demonstrated the 'ambition' that was much talked about at the conference, but which other heads of state and government lacked: She used the Madrider stage to declare climate policy to be one of the main focuses of the new Commission's work and to announce its 'Green Deal'" (FAZ, *Aufbruch im Mäuseschritt*, 13.12.2019)

Further, specifically in the German coverage, also parallel to the identity frame, Germany is portrayed as a powerful political leader within the EU.

### **Germany as a European Leader - Frame**

Not only is this frame relevant for identity representations but is also included in the power-frames. When quoting political leaders, such as the German chancellor, the role of the German government in EU discussions are underlined, consolidating Germany's role as a political leader within the EU and creating a European sense of power as well as a transnational identity whilst confirming the confidence in the national.

"In her weekly podcast, Chancellor Angela Merkel welcomed the EU Commission's goal of making Europe the first 'climate neutral continent'. Not all states are ready to do so yet. 'I hope we can make some progress in this next week,' she said. Merkel announced that the German government would play 'a very constructive role'. The EU European Council is meeting in parallel to the decisive negotiations in Madrid." (SZ,

*Stoff zum Streiten; Klimagipfel geht konfliktreich in entscheidende zweite Woche, 09.12.2019)*

By quoting national politicians, who stress the importance of joint European climate policy, the frame of power can be noted. In the German press, the leadership of the EU, and Germany's strong position within the EU are often expressed clearly.

"Europe wants to lead the way, and the EU will then, as always at climate conferences, be led by the current Council Presidency: Germany." (*Süddeutsche Zeitung, Biete Klimaschutz, nehme Geld. 02.12.2019*)

### **8.1.7. Space - Frames**

Space only found vague descriptions, which do not result in strong frames in the media. With the presumed elimination of space within the reporting on global issues, such as climate change, and the facilitation of a global outlook as a journalistic style, its representations in mediated communication are even more interesting to look at. Representations of space that outline a multifaceted geography and interrelated processes and practices taking place simultaneously in separate places are presented in the following. How Europe is delineated spatially as well as the national space as a paradigm for an understanding of global issues through domestication is outlined in the following.

#### **Redundancy of Borders - Frame**

"Article 6 is about protecting the climate with market mechanisms. This is based on an economic calculation according to the motto: Let us first reduce emissions where it is most efficient. Because it does not matter where the climate is protected, climate change knows no national borders." (*FAZ; Halbzeit in Madrid; 7.12.2019*)

Not only does this passage reinforce economic interest and political power of the EU, but quite literally stresses the nullification of space when it comes to climate change, especially regarding national borders. This, on the other hand, strengthens the EU as a legitimate decision-maker as it comprises 27 states and is often exceeded to the whole continent of Europe.

#### **Europe as one Space - Frame**

Similar to the aforementioned frame, this frame is expressed in an even more pronounced way, portraying Europe as one common geographical space.

"The most significant heat wave was in late July, affecting much of central and western Europe" (Expansion, 2019 *Sierra la poor década de calentamiento global*, 04.12.2019)

The localization of climate change impacts within Europe expands to more geographical spacial representations instead of national borders with terms like "central" and "western Europe", referring to Europe as one space. This frame becomes more clear when occurring on a global scale, delineating the global north, which includes Europe, versus the global south.

### **Global North vs Global South - Frame**

"Greta Thunberg is also the star of the "Fridays for Future" movement in Madrid, which she had set in motion with her school strike. It all started in Europe, where the most important climate conferences have taken place. But Thunberg has inspired girls and young women, especially in the southern hemisphere of the world, to follow her example and become pioneers in their own countries." (FAZ, *Wir sind doch viele*, 09.12.2019)

The space Europe constantly is connected to its leadership role and political power, as we see the EU but further its public, the citizen climate movement "Fridays for Future" as a case to underline the centrality of not only Europe but "Europeans" in climate leadership. Again, we see the distinction to another part of the world, the global south, which "the European" has inspired, and empowered. A narrative, controversial to western representations, which often alludes to the historical socio-cultural supremacy of 'the West'. This representation of space illustrates not only the interconnectedness of space and power but further the way in which frames allude to a culturally distinct stock of frames and an understanding of the "self" and its place in the world.

Within all of the frames and mediated representations of power, space, identity, and interests, the journalistic "style" of *domestication* is used. This means anchoring a seemingly global or foreign issue within the own local, in this case, national space to make it more tangible for the reader. Particularly Sweden is seen to use this style of reporting, however still stepping out of the purely national space by reconfirming its powerful role within the European North and allies they have a traditionally strong influence on.

"What Sweden is doing does plays a role, not only in the concrete export of fossil-free fuels to the North, the Baltic States and Poland, but also as an example. It reflects the role of a traditional nuclear power country with a solid environmental political

reputation thinks for the future of nuclear power." (Dagens Industri, *Seriösa klimatpolitiker värnar fossilfri kraft*, 11.12.2019)

To summarize, space defined by national borders is not made relevant for the technicalities of climate change in particular, however, the political space of Europe and its geographical space are inseparable. Europe is thought of as a continent often, especially when climate efforts and ambitions are referred to, a claim to become the "first climate-neutral continent" is made. Further, an east-west division within Europe is thematized, and a global north vs south divide is touched upon. These spatial constructions are however related to a socio-economic character, which in many cases underlines the framing of space as a level within representations of power, identity, and interest rather than a category on its own rights.

### **8.1.8. Space in the National Media Contexts**

#### **Space as Representation of Power Relations**

Space is only marginally represented in the Swedish coverage, mostly in combination with domestication of the climate, in this example, as a reinforced power position among the European North, and important European political partners of Sweden.

"What Sweden is doing does play a role, not only in the concrete export of fossil-free fuels to the North, the Baltic States and Poland, but also as an example." (Dagens Industri, *Seriösa klimatpolitiker värnar fossilfri kraft*, 11.12.2019)

It seems like somewhat of saturation with the climate change topic has reached Swedish public discourse taking place in the press. Apart from the relatively few articles found in the business paper, no notable differences between the papers could be made out. The argument, that business papers apply a more global outlook naturally could not hold in the Swedish case. Representations of space in the Spanish coverage are found in expressions within delineations of the climate impacts mostly, underlining the global impact of climate change.

#### **Global Impacts of Climate Change - Frame**

Apart from the global nature of climate change, the undefined geographic showplace of consequences of the former is outlined especially in the Spanish press, who focused most on climate change impacts in general.

"Countries ranging from the Bahamas to Japan and Mozambique have been hit by devastating tropical cyclones. Forest fires swept across the Arctic and Australia', Taalas said." (Expansion, *2019 Sierra la poor década de calentamiento global*, 04.12.2019)

Further, the expression of Spain as a climate victim through spacial relations of climate impacts in the country are reconstructed through the following frame.

### **Spain as Showplace of Climate Impacts - Frame**

These impacts are domesticated strongly, as Spain is also one of the countries suffering most from climate change impacts, as is stated in the following, combined with descriptions of the concrete effects of climate change on Spanish society, in this case, school children.

"Just look at the weather we've had in 2019. The drought, the lack of rain, the excess of rain... In Spain the main problem is extreme weather. Due to the floods and inundations, health centres and schools have been closed or disabled, which alters the daily life of these children." (El Mundo, *La Crisis Climática afecta ya a 500 Millones de Niños*, 11.12.2019)

Again this domestication is elevated on a European level, as even the spacial understanding roots in the geography of Europe in descriptions like the following.

"The report also mentions the heat wave that affected southwest and central Europe in June and caused several deaths in Spain and France. 'The most significant heat wave was in late July, affecting much of central and western Europe.'"(Expansion, *2019 Sierra la poor década de calentamiento global*, 04.12.2019)

Historically, the orientation towards Germany, as central to the EU and therefore a strong outlook towards a European identity and power as a legitimate realm of climate policies can be explained. On the same notion, a general criticism towards the inaction regarding climate is stressed and the importance of individual action and efforts on a national level are highlighted, often against the importance of big polluting nations.

The framing of the abolition of space is made very clear in the German reporting, as seen in the following example.

### **Redundancy of Borders - Frame**

"The philosophy is not complicated. Because greenhouse effects know no national borders, the fight against them does not need any. This means that countries can also protect the climate abroad by investing in renewable energies there, for example, or in

reforestation. Often this also means a financial transfer from North to South." (SZ, *Biete Klimaschutz, nehme Geld*, 02.12.2019)

A drastic difference between the papers could again not be noted, just as in the Spanish case, the papers framing approaches were somewhat homogenous, with the economic papers taking a more global view in general.

## **8.2. Twitter Analysis**

In the following, a closer look at the national discourses on Twitter is presented. A clear distinction of frames, as facilitated in the news media could not be found frequently in the limited space of 140 characters. However, an interpretation of picked up underlying sentiments of the news reporting and an analysis of the discourse on Twitter can provide a base for a discussion of public spheres, as the same issues are talked about at the same time. If under the same notions remains to be seen.

On Twitter, the outlook towards Europe and the EU is mostly pessimistic, guided by a rather negative outlook on the effectiveness of current climate policies. The complicated policy processes and foremost criticism towards the symbolism of the emergency declaration were voiced. Society, as well as politicians, were held responsible for insufficient climate action throughout the countries. What is most interesting when looking at the material on Twitter is the space for climate denialism and skeptics, which has no place in the press coverage along the countries.

### **Swedish Counter-Public on Twitter**

The discussion around the climate emergency on Swedish Twitter was very lively compared to both Germany and Spain. A rather direct tone towards and about politicians can be noted, as well as a share of climate change skepticism, not at all represented in the press coverage. Some frame translation could be noted, but a broad amount of discussion is in no way connected to the news content and outlook, which leads towards the assumption of Swedish Twitter as a counter-public sphere.

The sense of frustration with EU processes is reflected in the mediated discourse on Twitter. The question of how EU politicians were to travel, as the parliament, who voted for the climate

emergency, has a split seat between Strasbourg and Brussels. This was thematized frequently, not only by citizens but also by Swedish EU parliamentarians who actively took to Twitter to point out their consistency in climate action by posting pictures of them inside the train.

"Now the European Parliament has adopted the climate emergency! Good! With that being done, myself and Alice Bah Kuhnke hopped on the train from Strasbourg to Brussels again! Wondering how the other Swedes in the @EP\_Sverige who suddenly started to talk about #ClimateEmergency are going home? #ClimateActionNow" (Twitter User Sweden Politician 1: 28.11.2019)

Further, the parliamentarian centers his tweet around a national perspective. A few answered to the meteorologist who represents Sweden in the European Parliament for the green party. The politician did not respond to these tweets.

"Now that the climate emergency is implemented maybe a first measure for the EU could be to decide between Strasbourg or Brussels as headquarter. With that both costs and climate influence could be reduced." (Twitter Sweden User 1: 28.11.2019)

Another comment frowned upon the choice to tweet a picture by the politician, others point out the need for prospective solutions in the transport and energy sector.

"The Green Party, for us who think that selfies in a train make the whole difference." (Twitter Sweden User 2: 28.11.2019)

"Something the climate emergency definitely doesn't advice is hysteria. Moreover, the environmental and climate problems have to be resolved in the long run. Did you think everyone is going to take the train and electric cars? Can you manage to explain in more detail? Where shall the electricity come from?" (Twitter Sweden User 3: 28.11.2019)

Other Twitter users resorted to a more ironic and critical tone to express their frustration over the symbolical character of the climate emergency. This alludes to the frame of a failing EU in the press. Very directly, this can be shown in the following tweet:

"Concrete action and less talk is needed, you politicians just talk and do NOTHING against the cause, where is your crisis insight?" (Twitter Sweden User 4: 28.11.2019; emphasis in original)

Swedens leadership position in climate change is another frame that translates to the public discourse on Twitter. Here Sweden's low share in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions is mentioned:

"At the same time there is no running water in the worlds poorest countries. People leave their excrements in the closest river, together with all their waste which later reaches the ocean. Sweden stands for 0,2 % of all emissions, which makes your party the most unnecessary party in the world " (Twitter Sweden User 4: 28.11.2019)

Also, a broad share of climate change denialism can be noted in the Swedish Twitter discourse.

"Climate Emergency? On what basis?" (Twitter Sweden User 5: 28.11.2019)

Another user answers by questioning the EU's credibility:

"Exactly! Hard to take the EU seriously! Zero credibility!" (Twitter Sweden User 6: 28.11.2019)

The newspapers themselves tweeted their articles, but only got a few responses, which mostly stem from climate change deniers, often engaging in right-wing populist arguments revolving around migration issues.

"We should be grateful that politicians have claimed a climate emergency and remind us that there is a climate crisis. We could have had forgotten. Think about if the same politicians had chosen to call out a migration emergency before the migration crisis in 2015. Why is it that they didn't do it then?" (Twitter Sweden User 7: 28.11.2019)

This is only one of many tweets comparing the declaration of the climate emergency to the lack of a such before the migration crisis. Thereby, latent political positions against migration, as well as an implausibility of the severity of the climate crisis are expressed. This notion is idiosyncratic to the discussion on Twitter and is in no shape or form represented in the quality press coverage in Sweden.

The overall impression of the Twitter discussion gives reason to suppose a beginning re-politization of the climate issue in Sweden. The relative frequency of counter-ideological patterns such as climate skepticism and climate-denialism occurring on Twitter is a hint towards a movement of the climate change debate into a re-politized status. A counter-dynamic in the public that introduces counter-ideologies into the climate change discourse takes shape on Twitter. By a turn towards the national, rather than the supra-national as a legitimate realm for power, instrumentalized through a strong notion of domestication of climate action and leadership, a move away from the European Union is noted, parallel to the discourse in the press. Against the background of rising populism and a fairly strong consumption of alternative, right-wing media in Sweden, this discourse could be interesting to analyze further in future studies. Swedish Twitter, in this case, presents a counter-public to the discourse held in quality newspapers.

### **Germany's Debate on the Emergency-Terminology**

On German Twitter, one of the most prominent topics of discussion is the conversation about the translation of 'climate emergency' and the CDU's objection.

"Question for #history students: Who does the word "#Climate Emergency" remind you of? a) Hitler, b) Emergency laws, c) none of both." (Twitter Germany User 1: 28.11.2019)

"The European Parliament declares the #Climate Emergency and the @CDU\_CSU\_EP comes up with no better idea than to draw a comparison to NS. Yes, avoidance of NS language is important. But then simply translate it with #Climate emergency, fits better anyway. Significantly..." (Twitter Germany User 2: 28.11.2019)

"On the #climate emergency: By the way, the #world climate is not interested in whether symbolic political decisions are made, nor in whether terms are historically charged." (Twitter Germany User 3: 28.11.2019)

"It seems a bit like the CDU/CSU are using this as a political excuse so they don't have to vote for the climate emergency." (Twitter Germany User 4: 28.11.2019)

*Response:* "Of course that's an excuse. You just can't say that in public. Total lying assholes. They don't want to, they just talk about it. I'm sure it's some kind of lobbying thing." (Twitter Germany User 5: 28.11.2019)

A common understanding of disagreement with the party's objection on the ostensibly sensible translation to German is apparent in the data. This reflects the outlook of the reporting on the climate emergency in the German press, as a strong focus on this nationalized debate was put in the press.

Through the topic of declarations of climate emergency, the domestication of the climate issue takes place, not only on the national level of course but also on a local level.

"The first German city to declare a "climate emergency" was Constance, which was governed by a CDU mayor, by unanimous decision of the municipal council <https://spon.de/afB1w> via @MIRROR LINE" (Twitter Germany User 6: 28.11.2019)

*Response:* "On the lower levels one is often a lot further already." (Twitter Germany User 7: 28.11.2019)

*Response:* "The city @Essen\_Ruhr, which is governed by a CDU mayor, is not yet ready for this. Here all applications for additional funds for #Climate protection in the double budget of @Essen\_Ruhr rejected. The #climate emergency state anyway." (Twitter Germany User 8: 28.11.2019)

As well as in the other countries, a discussion about the symbolic character of this event is criticized and a call for action is voiced.

"The left-green majority in the #EU parliament has lost its marbles! #Communicate climate emergency and at the same time commute twice a week between #Brussels and #Strasbourg! My sense of humour!" (Twitter Germany User 9: 28.11.2019)

"It is a good sign that the EU Parliament has today declared a #climate emergency. BUT it is just symbolic politics for now. Let the words be followed by deeds!" (Twitter Germany User 10: 28.11.2019)

"On the #climate emergency: By the way, the #world climate is not interested in whether symbolic political decisions are made, nor in whether terms are historically charged." (Twitter Germany User 11: 28.11.2019)

Just as in the discourse in Sweden, the platform was used by climate skeptics to voice their opinions, although these were comparatively few. Rather a focus on the way EU politics function could be noted.

"Heard they declared a climate emergency. Scientific basis? Controversial. Ideological basis? 100%. A lot of people seem to know a lot about that ;D We will see what happens :)" (Twitter Germany User 12: 29.11.2019)

Very few tweets made a connection to migration, which hints at the debate on migration and also future climate migration. An interpretation of this as being a representation of populist ideas has to be rejected, as the irony of some of these tweets, more prominent in German, does not give enough support for such a conclusion. It is noted, that the possibility for such discussion is apparent in the German discussion on Twitter, however fractional it might be.

"If there is a climate emergency in Europe, then the problem of accepting migrants has been solved. In an area of man-made emergency, you cannot let in more people who cause CO<sub>2</sub>. That would well be reckless." (Twitter Germany User 14: 28.11.2019)

"I indeed find it interesting in which populist streams the political discourse meanwhile has found itself. Do we now declare a "state of emergency" every time there is a problem? Demographic emergency, economic emergency, rural-urban emergency, what next?" (Twitter Germany User 13: 29.11.2019)

In the press, the process of Europeanization of identity is furthest in Germany. The national identity is often put side by side with the European, mostly it is even made redundant, as an identification as leader within the EU brings out a European identity as the predominant social and collective identity. This happens to an extent, that often the lines between what is German and what is European seem to fade. A European outlook is mostly missing from the discussion on Twitter, as the focus lies on the national party's issue with the declaration. Surprisingly, the frame of Germany as a leader within the EU is also missing. The shortcomings of German climate actions are generally more present on Twitter than in the press. The very salient frame of Europe as a climate leader is somewhat rejected in the Twitter discourse, which is most probably due to the focus on only one event, which was not received as a substantial

achievement in climate action by the public. A general frustration with the lack of climate action is noted, as well as a domesticated discussion on climate action.

### **Spanish Individual Action in Focus**

A sense of urgency for the cutting of emissions on the big scale versus the actions taken on a smaller, national scale is reflected in the discourse on Twitter. Unlike Swedes, Spaniards largely repost the newspaper articles, often without giving their own comments or opinions, which reflects a rising trust in their media.

"If the United States and China do not make an effort to combat the #ClimateEmergency, there is nothing to be done, even if Brazil and India join the efforts, which they do not." (Twitter Spain User 1: 29.11.2019)

The importance to take individual climate action is put forwards, which is also a common frame in the press coverage. Here it is commented by the unfeasibility and effectiveness of such, given the infrastructural circumstances.

"Let's see which cities in Spain are the ones that melt the most watts at Christmas while making 1 hour shutdowns due to the climate and environmental emergency." (Twitter Spain User 2: 28.11.2019)

*Response:* "the truth @\_esther\_sanz As much as we want in Spain, we can't do much about the climate and environmental emergency. If Spain went back to the stone age for 100 years nothing would change. For this to happen it is necessary that the polluters do it" (Twitter Spain User 3: 29.11.2019)

Some users point out the Spanish efforts and rising awareness about climate change, which was also present in the press.

"The @Europarl\_EN declares a climate emergency, while here, the Spanish are becoming more and more aware of #Recycling... ' Pedro Piqueras in @informativost5 #EA26\_COP25 " (Twitter Spain User 4: 28.11.2019)

Spain, and even Europe, are framed as "non-polluters" and already taking all the effort possible to save the climate. At the same time, the willingness to change their behavior on grounds of the climate emergency is doubted for Spanish citizens.

"The statements of #EmergenciaClimatica, without a budget line are only a paper..."(Twitter Spain User 7: 29.11.2019)

The symbolic character of the proclamation is often pointed out, connected to a call for concrete financial drafts and political actions. Seldom, criticism is voiced about the parliamentarians of

the EU, which was one of the strongest points in the Swedish twitter discourse. This could be explained by a rather opinionated press, which covered this criticism in their reporting.

"I assume that those who have voted for #ClimateEmergency will return from the European Parliament to their place of residence by bicycle rather than by plane. And while we are losing competitiveness with these statements, China and India are smiling happily." (Twitter Spain User 8: 29.11.2019)

Even when arguments like the following are brought up, a lack of debate is noted. The following tweet did get 47 retweets, so people that posted this tweet on their timelines, but only one person commented on the tweet not presenting a challenging view.

"The European Parliament has declared a climate emergency, and scientific reports continue to trickle in explaining that we are on the verge of a catastrophe, that the feedback loops are there, that extreme phenomena can be unleashed, but there is not going to be a single radical policy against climate change because that would mean questioning the very foundations of European economic policy. It would imply thinking about whether it is convenient to keep sectors such as energy privatized and wait until it is decided that it is economically profitable to massively adopt renewable energies. It would imply thinking that enormous investments have to be made and that public debt is vital." (Twitter Spain User 9: 28.11.2019, 2 tweets)

*Response:* "The EU is 100% capitalism. How will it seek measures that would go against its very foundation? It is worrying because then the only thing that can put some solution would be massive citizen protests and that... see you in the distance." (Twitter Spain User 10: 28.11.2019)

Some more conversation in answer to newspapers posting their articles on twitter could be found, for example in answer to Expansion who tweeted their article with the headline "Europe, first continent to declare a climate emergency" (@expansioncom, 28.11.2019)

"...there would be no stopping the world, so many car factories... of #batteries... of textiles... of "machinery" ...so let's make a stop and go back to the #stone age huh??" (Twitter Spain User 5: 38.11.2019)

"With so many economic problems, employment, migration, growth, homelessness, political discontent... that's the emergency? Good way to distract" (Twitter Spain User 6: 28.11.2019)

Such notions of contrasting climate urgency by other political and social topics are the closest the Spanish twitter discourse comes to comparable skeptic notions is German and Swedish twitter debate. Populist notions were not reported. A translation of frames could only be noted in a few instances. Another topic, the lack of actions is broadly thematized, reflecting a frame of climate urgency and the importance of individual action in the press coverage respectively. The framing of "EU vs Others", undermining a European identity is adapted.

## 9. Conclusions and Discussion

This thesis has examined mediated representations of climate change, more specifically, how collective European identity, interests, space, and power are expressed. The aim of this study was to analyze how these representations were constructed and reproduced in media content on climate change in different European countries, to see if a European Outlook is applied in news media and social media. To conclude, a summary of the results shall be given in order to answer the research questions presented in the problematization. A reflection on the results as well as their implication for the contemporary political debate will follow thereafter. Further, a short outlook on the learnings and opportunities for future research in this area is going to be provided.

### **Q1: How are space, power, identity & interests constructed in the news media articles on climate change?**

A primary finding was the interconnectedness of these concepts. Representations of European identity can barely exist on their own, without being expressed through interests, space, or power and vice versa. As Europe, and ultimately the EU, are hard to capture discursively, its different aspects are used as a pars pro toto. "Europe" and "the EU" are therefor represented in these news articles through the representations of power, space, identity, and interests towards climate change.

In line with previous research, collective identity was found to function on different layers. Local, national, and transnational identities were noticed. A focus was put on the national and the trans-national, namely a European identity in this thesis. A fluidity and parallelism were recorded, as these identities are in no way mutually exclusive, they rather feed off each other. The most prevalent frames manifesting the such in communicated content were the antagonistic frame of "us vs. them", and the "climate leadership frame". On both the national and the European level, identities are solidified and defined through differentiation towards the "other", facilitated by comparison to other countries and their climate efforts. This, in turn, enables the "climate leadership" frame, which puts the country of reference at the top when it comes to

climate action and efforts, either within the EU or the EU as a whole, delineated against another country, or groups of political actors.

As for interests, the shared goal of combatting climate change lies at the core of the representation of other aspects of interest. Economic frames of climate change were reflected in the data most prominently. The European household and each country's contribution, as well as the cost of climate damage, have occurred as representations of interests. These are not always alike amongst the member states of the EU, and in this case, created an interest-divide along the East-West division of the Union. Combatting climate change is closely connected to the reduction of emissions, which comes with a financial burden for the countries.

Based on the shared goals, the EU is framed as the legitimate realm for fulfilling these common climate incentives. The institutions of the EU are presented as powerful and able to tackle climate change on a larger scale than what each country would be able to do individually. Further, the power struggle in framing contest between frame donors and especially between stakeholders with political or societal power against alternative views became apparent.

As for representations of space, the analysis showed that within a European context, space becomes somewhat redundant in the context of climate change. Instead, geographical terminology of the global North vs South and European East vs West is chosen. Oftentimes, Europe is referred to as a continent and a spacial representation that stands for political power.

## **Q2: How does the framing of climate change differ in the mediated discourse of European countries?**

When looking at the results of the country-specific analysis, it becomes clear that a translation of frames between the countries has taken place to some extent. The frames applied are quite homogenous throughout the European countries and seem to cross national borders easily, especially during the reporting of the climate conference in Madrid. However, the frames for each country did also diverge a lot, depending on the stock of frames available in that country and the specific narrative and stance towards climate and the EU. The results of this study support theoretical considerations about a global homogenization process at the journalistic professional level and can confirm international events like the UN climate conferences as

fertilizers for such developments. Mancini (2008) categorizes two distinct cultures, the globalized professional culture which encompasses the aforementioned trend towards homogenization in journalistic production (issue framing) and the rather distinct national cultures journalists operate in (specific narratives). This dichotomy crystallizes through the two-step structure of the analysis and confirms previous findings (Lück et al., 2017).

The press coverage in Sweden is strongly focused on a national outlook and is highly critical of the actions of the European Union, showing a low identification with the EU as such. Taking on the frame of Sweden as a climate leader, a focus towards adaptation to climate change rather than mitigation, as often seen in other countries is put. These frames mirror the countries' strategic position in climate politics globally, Sweden's relationship to other countries inside and outside the EU, its economic position, and self-positioning as historically climate active country.

Alternative frames on Swedish Twitter present a counter-public and show the potential for a re-politization of the climate topic in public discourse. The issue is again becoming contested, making room for climate denialism and skeptics, not in the news media, but the alternative public sphere provided by Twitter. The Twitter discourse does reflect and take on some of the frames presented in the press. Although Swedish Twitter users do not as frequently repost or comment news articles, some frames do translate into the discourse. These frames were noted throughout all of the three countries on Twitter. A general frustration with European politics is seen as well as a very national outlook on the climate challenges, a sense of the "lone leader" can be made out.

News coverage in Spain, on the other hand, focuses mainly on the EU as orientation, through the "middle-man" of Germany. As one historically stands for the other in the Spanish discourse, the two countries are often put next to each other to point out Spain's role and belonging to the EU. Frustration with other countries and their lacking climate efforts delineated against a very disciplined Spanish public is pointed out and translates to the Twitter discourse. Spain's rising trust in its media is reflected by frequent reposting of news articles on Twitter.

Further, all of the three countries showed frustration with the symbolic character of EU politics and expressed the need for more action. Germany can be seen as the most Europeanized

country, as a national identity is hidden within the European, hegemonic identity. Its power is legitimized by reassuring the strong German leadership within the EU. Astonishingly, the rather high coal dependency and a very high risk of climate effects are not an issue of frequent reporting. Further, they do not occur in the debate on Twitter but are mostly found in foreign debates. This contesting frame seems to have been overpowered by the ambition and leadership frame applied to German climate politics. A debate about the Christian Democratic Party's quarreling with the wording of the climate emergency reflects the country's omnipresent socio-cultural confrontation with their past, but is mostly called out as "unnecessary" and 'not to the topic' by the public on Twitter.

A rather disappointing notion of the expected "monitoring" or "watch-dog function" of the public debate on Twitter is found. Looking at the countries' usage of social media, Facebook seems to be the dominant medium used most for retrieving news. Twitter with its short messaging function and rather elite profile was thought to present a platform for deliberation - this assumption was neglected in all countries. These results might have been different if countries had not been taken into consideration and English tweets would have been allowed. As this methodological shortcoming could not be bypassed in this study, this is a question for future research. The collaborative approach to framing described in previous studies about framing on Twitter (Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013) could not be found in this study. It is believed that the research design accounts for this finding, as we do see a lot of citizen protest and climate action being organized through social media. It might be the case, that Twitter is actually not the medium of choice when it comes to deliberation on the issue of climate politics. Further, the event and date chosen to base this analysis on, was a rather 'low impact' one. This was surprising, as well as its scarce coverage in all of the countries' press. The declaration of the EU that a climate emergency can be spoken of did not resonate with the public. This combined with the frames of frustration and calls for more action does paint a picture of a general disappointment in the EU's eagerness in climate efforts and actual policies. The result of a rather non-euphoric reaction towards "another" symbolic act does consequently fit in quite well into this logic. Regardless of the methodological shortcomings in the Twitter analysis, a general uniformity to the discourse on Twitter throughout the countries is noted.

As we see with the framing devices of European identity, pointing out Europeans as one group, using the pronouns "us" and "we" do not take paragraphs or complicated framing devices to

anchor this frame. It is simply rejected by Twitter users, including European politicians. The European layer of identity is not reflected in the Twitter content, despite the relation to the European act. Moreover, the EU is strongly criticized for its symbolic announcement and asked for actual policies and actions. Somehow, this does reflect the relationship between the public and the political elite regarding climate issues. As a general frustration with lacking or "too little" climate policies spreads across Europe, civil engagement and weakly demonstrations on the issue have multiplied. A critical and somewhat frustrated view towards politics is reflected in the Twitter content about the emergency proclamation. As the discourse on Twitter was only regarded in each of the countries' first language, exchange with users from different countries was automatically excluded from the analysis. In the notion of Europe as a climate leader, being the first continent to proclaim a climate emergency, no frames of identification with Europe as a climate leader could be identified on Twitter. This means, that the 'vertical' European "frame translation" from press to social media was relatively low. A distinct discourse around the topic on Twitter emerged, sharing and attaching the press articles as sources, however no discussion around the articles themselves was seen to be facilitated. The frames on twitter are somewhat similar between the countries and suggest a horizontal frame translation in a shared public sphere.

### **European Public Sphere?**

Although the "national" discourses were looked at in isolation from each other, the frames through which the events were discussed are strikingly similar. Despite the focus on national Twitter discussions, there seems to be a stock of frames, not reflected in any of the national coverage that could be inherent to the global online discussion which might take place parallel to the national debates in their first language. As Van de Steeg (2002) elaborates, the extent of the similarity or overlap in the systems of meanings employed in different media is an indication to which actors who partake in the discourse take part in the same public sphere. Applying this logic, this would hint to a networked public sphere reflected on Twitter, strongest in the national Swedish context. We do also find support for this suggestion in the data on the printing press, as throughout the different countries there is a wide overlap between the frames and a seemingly common stock of frames used. Yes, there are differences in the frames used nationally towards narrativity, but the framing approaches are somewhat homogenous. Does this give reason to think a European Public Sphere is consolidating? "It could be that the same issues are discussed,

the same facts and arguments are presented, but also that there is a common frame of reference" (Van de Steeg, 2002: 509). Where these conditions are given, and media content overlaps, it could indicate that "the public discourse in these specific media coincide" (Van de Steeg, 2002: 509). As Risse (2003) put it, "[w]e can speak of a European public sphere, if and when people speak about the same issues at the same time using the same criteria of relevance and are mutually aware of each other's viewpoints" (p. 3). However, we need to be careful not to jump to conclusions. A mutual awareness of each other's viewpoints has not found any support in the data. This study did only look at the mediated representation in one instance, namely climate change, in a time frame when two internationally important events took place, which were crucial for the politics of climate change action. Therefore, caution has to be exercised. A European Public Sphere would imply the Europeanization of national public spheres. Generally, Europeanization has shown to be event-driven (Hänska & Bauchowitz, 2019: 2), which does affect the generalizability of these results. As Beck (2008) describes, global threats can create global risk communities at particular points in time (2008: 97). The results of this study do give reason for some speculations about the Europeanization of national discourses happening parallel in Spain and Germany, at least. Nevertheless, we can only confidently speak of an issue public sphere, or "European risk community". The "banal Europeanism" (2009: 22) Olausson refers to, might come closest to what we have support for in the data. I would argue, that this issue-public sphere is carried and characterized by a strong identification as European, based on different notions of collective identity, power, space, and interests, which is consolidated and reflected in the mediated representations of such. Sweden has to be regarded as an outlier in this case.

With this unity, on the one hand, a split, on the other hand, cannot be left unnoticed. The divide between East and West Europe was very apparent in the data, as well as the observation of a de-Europeanization process of the climate issue in Sweden, paired with a strong national outlook and negative signs of identification with the EU in the northern country. Support can be found for Europeanization and European identity, carried by somewhat of an "imagined community" of countries dependent on a strong EU and an identification through the latter, rather than a national outlook. This gives reason to believe, that the global crisis of climate change goes both ways. It does strengthen the Europeanization in some countries, but it weakens it in others. It is critical to notice the parallel to their respective positions in global

climate politics. Sweden exceeds the EU mean climate efforts and standards, while still laying below the international climate goals. As it has been a struggle to agree on climate policies and "paces" *within* the EU, the hardships of agreeing on higher goals *globally* and reaching the critical climate goals in time become apparent. The generally frustrated tone noticed in the Swedish data might hint towards this as a stretch within the EU between climate ambitious countries and less ambitious, and ultimately economically unable countries in the East. With Spain and Germany in the middle, somewhat match with the EU's mean ambition, therefore identify strongly with it.

## 9.1. Reflection & Outlook

Studying this topic from a social constructionist perspective gave the freedom to interpret the framing approaches in relation to a cultural stock of frames. To connect the perspectives of identity, politics, and public debate with the mediated representations was found crucial to this analysis. The lack of an established methodology was resolved through working closely with the theories of social constructionist framing and previous research on mediated representations of identity and globalism. This helped facilitate a rather open approach and a less biased look at the data. An argument for the wider application of this theory in framing studies shall be made, as it counteracts the terminological pluralism marking current framing research. The inclusion of a cultural perspective and the freedom of a "one size fits all" approach to different forms of media documents back this argument. The combination of topics, with the added layer of the public debate on Twitter gives this study a unique insight into the comparison of European countries.

This study brings forward several results that can be useful for future studies in the field. However, it also leaves a few question marks, especially in the field of social network analysis. A longitudinal study design could give insights into the phases of climate change on the public agenda and the changes of perception under latest events. It would be interesting to study this topic from a view that includes the representations of climate change communication in Eastern European countries. A mix of countries throughout the globe could also be of interest to gain knowledge on how reality is constructed through the reporting and social deliberation on climate change. Further, it would be alluring to widen this study towards other issues, not only

focusing on the changing climate but allowing a broader view on other topics to ultimately see if this sense of "Europeanization" holds if analyzed outside this probable "issue-public sphere" or "risk community" around climate change. This will add to the stock of knowledge around Europeanization and could help explain social and political processes taking place through and in the media. Especially research on the latest rise of populism throughout the EU could benefit from such an approach. Further studies looking into the details of the re-politization processes in countries like Sweden, examining their step-back towards a national outlook on climate change, rather than further globalization could be of interest.

"Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity." (Robert Schuman: 1950) As stated in the beginning of this thesis, a European identity, and hence solidarity, can only flourish when its people can identify under common achievements. Climate action is therefore a crucial point which will not only determine the future of the planet, but also the future of the European Union.

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